Anonymity and Rewards in Peer Rating Systems by Garms, Lydia et al.
Anonymity and Rewards in Peer Rating Systems
Lydia Garms( )12 ?, Siaw–Lynn Ng2, Elizabeth A. Quaglia2, and Giulia Traverso3
1 IMDEA Software Institute, Spain
lydia.garms@imdea.org
2 Royal Holloway, University of London, UK {S.Ng,Elizabeth.Quaglia}@rhul.ac.uk
3 Ernst&Young, Switzerland
giulia.traverso@ey.ch.com
Abstract. When peers rate each other, they may rate inaccurately to boost their own reputation or
unfairly lower another’s. This could be mitigated by having a reputation server incentivise accurate
ratings with a reward. However, assigning rewards becomes challenging when ratings are anonymous,
since the reputation server cannot tell which peers to reward for rating accurately. To address this,
we propose an anonymous peer rating system in which users can be rewarded for accurate ratings,
and we formally define its model and security requirements. In our system ratings are rewarded in
batches, so that users claiming their rewards only reveal they authored one in this batch of ratings.
To ensure the anonymity set of rewarded users is not reduced, we also split the reputation server into
two entities, the Rewarder, who knows which ratings are rewarded, and the Reputation Holder, who
knows which users were rewarded. We give a provably secure construction satisfying all the security
properties required. For our construction we use a modification of a Direct Anonymous Attestation
scheme to ensure that peers can prove their own reputation when rating others, and that multiple
feedback on the same subject can be detected. We then use Linkable Ring Signatures to enable
peers to be rewarded for their accurate ratings, while still ensuring that ratings are anonymous.
Our work results in a system which allows accurate ratings to be rewarded, whilst still providing
anonymity of ratings with respect to the central entities managing the system.
1 Introduction
Anonymity has long been a sought-after property in many cryptographic primitives, such as public-key
encryption [5], identity-based encryption [2, 17], and a defining one in others, such as group signatures [20]
and ring signatures [52]. A plethora of more complex protocols, from broadcast encryption [41] to cryp-
tocurrencies [38], have been enhanced by user anonymity.
An example of such protocols are rating systems, also referred to as reputation systems, in which users
can be rated by providing feedback on goods or services, with the support of a reputation server. Each
user has a reputation value based on these ratings, which can be used to evaluate their trustworthiness.
In this context, the value of anonymity lies in the fact that users are able to give honest feedback without
fear of repercussions. This may occur when there is a lack of trust for the reputation server, or when
users are concerned about retaliation.
Anonymity has received a great amount of attention in this area and abundant existing literature
covers a range of anonymous rating systems in both the centralised and distributed settings. Distributed
systems, e.g., [44], have no reputation server and use local reputation values, i.e., reputation values
created by users on other users. For example, a user may generate a reputation value based on feedback
from querying other users. This means a user does not have a unique reputation value, but many other
users hold their own reputation value for them. In this setting, privacy preserving decentralised reputation
systems [49] are designed to maintain anonymity when answering queries from other users.
We focus on centralised systems, since the reputation systems used by most service providers such as
Airbnb, Uber and Amazon are of this type. In the centralised setting, a central reputation server enrols
users and forms reputation values on these users. In [11, 27, 10, 22, 21] anonymity of a rating is provided
to all except the reputation server, and multiple ratings cannot be given on the same subject. In [57],
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multiple reputation servers are used so that anonymity of ratings holds, unless all reputation servers
collude. Other works provide anonymity of ratings in the presence of a corrupted reputation server [53,
50, 30, 32]. In [3, 8] anonymity is achieved with a different approach. The reputation server still enrols
users, but no longer forms reputations. Instead users collect tokens based on anonymous ratings from
other users and prove their own reputation.
Whilst the benefits of anonymity are clear, it is also understood that this same property can pro-
vide an opportunity for malicious users to misbehave. They may “bad mouth” other users, for instance
competitors, giving dishonest negative feedback to these users to decrease their reputation. Or they may
collude and give each other positive feedback in order to inflate their own reputation. To avoid this,
the system can provide either a mechanism to revoke the malicious user’s anonymity (typically achieved
through a traceability property), or incentivize good behaviour by rewarding users. The rating systems
proposed so far approach this issue via user tracing. Indeed, in schemes where the reputation server can
de–anonymise ratings [11, 27, 22, 21], inaccurate ratings can be punished.
We take a different approach by rewarding honest ratings in anonymous peer rating systems, where
users are peers and anonymously rate each other. Examples include peer-to-peer file sharing [1], collab-
orative knowledge production [46, 14, 33], and shared knowledge of internet and software vulnerabilities
[36, 54]. In such systems the rewarding approach works well since raters are also participating within the
system and so have an interest in rating accurately to increase their reputation through rewards. The use
of incentives to encourage accurate feedback has already been discussed in [48, 56], but ratings are not
anonymous.
Privacy-preserving incentive schemes [45, 39, 35, 9, 12], where users can be incentivised anonymously
without their transactions being linked, have also been proposed. In [45] it is described how such incentives
could contribute towards a reputation value. However, these schemes do not capture the ability to reward
accurate ratings. Firstly, ratings must be incentivised as they are submitted, at which point it is not
known whether a rating is accurate. When accurate ratings are determined it is then difficult to return
the incentive to the relevant user. Secondly, in [39, 35, 9, 12], a user’s balance is updated each time a user
receives an incentive. However, a user may have submitted k accurate rating on other users, which are
unlinkable. Then their balance of n should increase by k, but instead they receive k updated tokens for
a balance of n+ 1. Finally, in [45, 35, 9, 12] a user would have to participate in an interactive protocol to
rate others.
Therefore the challenge remains to rewards users that rate accurately, whilst preserving the anonymity
of their ratings even with respect to the reputation server. This is what we address in this paper.
1.1 Our work
We consider an anonymous peer rating system in which, at each round of interaction, users rate each
other by providing feedback to the reputation server.
Our contribution is to allow accurate ratings to be incentivised and weighted by reputation, whilst
still ensuring anonymity of ratings. Achieving this is challenging for two reasons. First, the reputation
used to weight feedback could be used to de-anonymise a user. We can partially mitigate this by ensuring
reputation is coarse-grained as in [8] (by rounding the reputation value, for instance), which ensures that
a user who has a unique reputation score does not reveal their identity. The trade off between precision of
reputation and size of anonymity sets is further discussed in [51]. Second, and crucially, accurate ratings
must be incentivised without being de-anonymised. We achieve this by incentivising a large set of ratings
simultaneously, and rewarding the users responsible for such ratings. With this approach, however, the
anonymity set can be reduced substantially. Indeed, a malicious reputation server could decide to only
reward a small number of ratings it seeks to de-anonymise, and then check which users are rewarded with
an increase in reputation. These users then must have authored these ratings.
A way to lessen the impact in both cases is to restrict access to reputation. A specific trusted entity,
the Reputation Holder, holds the reputations of users, and the latter should only be revealed sparingly.
We do not specify exactly when and how reputations should be revealed in order to allow for a flexible
scheme, and because this has been discussed in the existing literature. For example, in [32, 53], users can
prove their reputation and so can decide which users to reveal it to. A simpler example is that a user
would have to demonstrate a good reason to learn another’s reputation from the Reputation Holder.
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We go further and introduce a new entity, the Rewarder, who chooses which ratings to reward, and
who cannot see which users have their reputation increase. As the Reputation Holder no longer knows
which ratings were rewarded, they cannot compare these ratings with the users that claim rewards and
so reduce the anonymity set. We formalise this in the Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation
Holder requirement. For completeness, we also consider the case that the Reputation Holder and the
Rewarder collude or are the same entity. Clearly they learn that each user that was rewarded n times,
authored n of the ratings rewarded, however they should learn no more than this. We formalise this in
our Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption requirement.
Although we are aware that using reputation values and incentivising accurate ratings both in-
escapably reduce the anonymity sets of ratings, in this work we aim to provide the best anonymity
achievable given the functionality. Furthermore, we also must ensure that users do not attempt to sub-
vert the system by claiming rewards that they are not entitled to, by providing multiple ratings on
the same user per round, by lying about their reputation, or by framing other users so that they seem
to be cheating. We formalise this in our Fair Rewards, Traceability4, Unforgeability of Reputation and
Non–Frameability requirements.
We first provide a model and security requirements for an anonymous peer rating system APR, which
formalises the necessary privacy and security properties discussed above. We use property-based defini-
tions, which are intuitive and useful when proving security. We then give a construction that is provably
secure given these security requirements. Our construction makes use of Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) [13], which we use to sign feedback. This ensures that, whilst signed feedback are unlinkable,
multiple feedback on the same user can be detected, due to the user controlled linkability feature of
DAA. We modify the DAA primitive so that when giving feedback a user can prove they have a partic-
ular reputation for that round, so that feedback can be weighted. We then make use of Linkable Ring
Signatures [42] to allow to incentivise users who rate accurately. For every rating a freshly generated
verification key is attached, encrypted under the Rewarder’s public key. When the Rewarder rewards a
rating, they publish the corresponding decrypted verification keys. The user can then sign a linkable ring
signature with the corresponding secret key and claim their incentive from the Reputation Holder. The
linkability of the signature scheme can be used to detect if a user tries to claim for the same incentive
twice, whilst its anonymity ensures that ratings remain anonymous.
Although DAA and Linkable Ring Signature schemes are similar primitives, we note that they have
subtly different properties that make them exactly suited to their particular role in building an APR
scheme. As ring signature key pairs can be generated without involving any central entity, this allows
a new verification key to be generated for every rating. The fact that a central entity, in our case the
Reputation Holder, must authorise the creation of a new DAA key pair, prevents sybil attacks. Otherwise,
users could easily create multiple identities and rate other users as many times as they wish per round.
Unlike group signatures [20], DAA schemes do not allow a trusted opener to de–anonymise signatures,
ensuring that anonymity of ratings holds with respect to the Rewarder.
In this work we provide an extended version of the paper published at SCN 2020 [31]. This includes
security proofs for our construction, the full security model for the modified DAA primitive, and the
modified DAA construction that provably satisfies this model.
While the main aim of our anonymous peer rating system is to ensure anonymous and honest feedback,
it is also important to consider how it is affected by many other conventional attacks on rating systems.
The unfair ratings attack [25] is mitigated by the detection of multiple ratings per subject per round.
The incentives also encourage users to give more accurate feedback. The self–rating or self–promoting
attack [37] is mitigated by encouraging all users to give feedback on their own performance. Sybil at-
tacks [26], where a user creates multiple identities to join the system to give unfair feedback, can be
mitigated by making joining the system expensive, and by a robust registration process. This also miti-
gates against whitewashing attacks [23], where a user leaves and rejoins to shed a bad reputation. The
on-off attack [55], where a user behaves honestly to increase their reputation before behaving dishonestly,
can be somewhat mitigated by adjusting the weighting of the final reputation formation in our system,
so that bad behaviour will cause the reputation to deteriorate quickly. Reputation lag exploitation [40],
where a user exploits the interval before the latest round of ratings takes effect, cannot be prevented but,
as before, we can mitigate it by making the reputation deteriorate faster on bad behaviour.
4 Traceability here refers to the requirement that multiple ratings cannot be given on the same subject per round.
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2 Anonymous Peer Rating Systems: Definitions and Security Models
In this section, we introduce and formally define an anonymous peer rating (APR) system, and the security
and privacy properties it should satisfy. We consider a set of users U = {uidi} interacting with each other
in rounds. At the end of each round they rate each other’s performance, by anonymously sending a
numerical feedback alongside their reputation to the Rewarder. The Rewarder collects ratings, discards
multiple ratings on the same subject, and rewards accurate feedback by outputting a set of incentives. A
user claims to the Reputation Holder that they were responsible for a number of these incentives. The
final reputation held by the Reputation Holder on a user is based on three components: weighted feedback
from other users, the number of incentives they have successfully claimed, and their previous reputation.
We present an illustration of our model in Figure 1 and formally capture this as follows.
Fig. 1: Diagram illustrating our model.
Setup & Key Generation The Reputation Holder and Rewarder generate their own key pairs. The
group public key gpk = (param, rwpk, rhpk) consists of the public keys of both entities.
Setup(1τ , f1, f2)→ param: input a security parameter 1τ , and two generic functions f1 and f2 which
calculate the reputations of users. The function f1 is input the number of ratings a user is being
rewarded for, and outputs the second component, r′′, of their reputation for this round. The function
f2 is input the two components of a user’s reputation for this round, and their reputation from
the previous round, and outputs their final reputation for this round5. Setup outputs the public
parameters param which include f1, f2.
RHKeyGen(param)→ (rhsk, rhpk): performed by the Reputation Holder, outputs the Reputation Holder’s
secret key rhsk and public key rhpk.
RWKeyGen(param)→ (rwsk, rwpk): performed by the Rewarder, outputs the Rewarder’s secret key
rwsk and public key rwpk.
Join When a user joins the system they engage in an interactive protocol with the Reputation Holder
after which they are issued with secret keys used to provide anonymous ratings and to collect rewards
for giving honest feedback. We assume users must join the system before a round of ratings begins.
〈Join(gpk), Issue(rhsk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the system by engaging in an interactive protocol with
the Reputation Holder. The user uid and Reputation Holder perform algorithms Join and Issue re-
spectively. These are input a state and an incoming message Min, and output an updated state, an
outgoing message Mout, and a decision, either cont, accept, or reject, which denote whether the proto-
col is still ongoing, has ended in acceptance or has ended in rejection respectively. (States are values
necessary for the next stage of the protocol.) The initial input to Join is the group public key, gpk,
5 For example, in [56], f1 is simply the number of incentives received multiplied by some weight, and f2 is the
weighted sum of these components.
4
whereas the initial input to Issue is the Reputation Holder’s secret key, rhsk, and the group public key
gpk. If the user uid accepts, Join privately outputs the user’s secret key gsk[uid], and Issue outputs
reg[uid], which stores the user’s registration and will be used to later allocate that user a reputation.
Ratings at Round l Each user uid has a reputation r[uid, l] at round l, also held by the Reputation
Holder. We assume that reputation is coarse-grained, which lessens the impact on anonymity with respect
to the Reputation Holder. At Round l, a user uid with reputation r forms a rating ρ with Rate on user
uid′ based on a numerical feedback fb, which is sent to the Rewarder via a secure anonymous channel6.
For flexibility we do not specify the form of fb, in [56] this a real number between 0 and 1. The user stores
a trapdoor td for each rating for later use when claiming incentives. The Rewarder can verify ratings with
Verify.
After collecting the valid ratings weighted by reputation, the Rewarder calculates an intermediate
value r′[uid, l] for each uid with FormRep1, through which it also detect multiple ratings on the same
subject. This value captures the average feedback given on uid weighted by the reputation of the rater,
and is sent to the Reputation Holder via a secure authenticated channel.
Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)→ (ρ, td) : performed by the user with identifier uid, with input the
user’s secret key gsk[uid], the group public key gpk, a feedback fb, the user who they are rating uid′,
the current round l, their reputation r, and a reputation token ω output in the previous round by
AllocateRep. Outputs a rating ρ and a trapdoor td.
Verify(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, gpk) → {0, 1}: a public function that is performed by the Rewarder when receiving
a rating tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ). Outputs 1 if ρ is valid on the feedback fb for user uid′ at round l for
reputation r under the group public key gpk, and 0 otherwise.
FormRep1(uid, l, (fb1, r1, ρ1), · · · (fbk, rk, ρk), gpk)→ r′[uid, l]: performed by the Rewarder with input
k valid rating tuples {(fbi, uid, ri, ρi) : i ∈ [1, k]} on user uid at round l, and the group public key




if all ratings originate from different users’ secret keys. Otherwise
outputs ⊥ (in practice also outputs ratings that should be discarded).
Incentivising accurate feedback The Rewarder compares each feedback on uid′. If this is close to
r′[uid′, l] then this rating will be considered to be accurate and will be given an incentive. We define
accurate as close to r′. However, our model could simply be adapted to incorporate different metrics of
accuracy.
The Rewarder inputs the k accurate ratings in this round to Incent, which outputs k incentives which
are broadcast publicly to all users. Incent must be deterministic, to allow users to identify which incentives
match their ratings.
A user collects all its incentives and can then use CollectIncent, along with the trapdoors stored
earlier, to output an incentive claim σ for each of their incentives. They send these incentive claims to the
Reputation Holder over a secure authenticated channel. Incentive claims are verified by the Reputation
Holder with VerifyIncent. After gathering all the valid incentive claims, the Reputation Holder calculates
the second component r′′[uid, l + 1] of a user’s reputation at round l with FormRep2, which also checks
that no user has claimed the same incentive twice. This value reflects how in line the feedback of uid is
with respect to other users’ feedback, incentivising users to give honest feedback.
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk) → t1, · · · , tk: a deterministic function per-
formed by the Rewarder on input k rating tuples {(fbi, uidi, ri, ρi) : i ∈ [1, k]} from round l and its
secret key rwsk. Outputs k incentives t1, · · · , tk.
CollectIncent(uid, (fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, td), t1, · · · , tk, gpk)→ σ: performed by the user uid who gave the rat-
ing tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ) for round l corresponding to trapdoor td, with input the incentives output by
the Rewarder t1, · · · , tk. Outputs an incentive claim σ if the rating tuple (fb, uid′, r, ρ) corresponds
to an incentive in list t1, · · · , tk and ⊥ otherwise.
6 We require a secure channel to prevent the Reputation Holder from accessing the ratings, and determining
which ratings will be rewarded by following the strategy of the Rewarder. This knowledge would allow the
Reputation Holder to decrease the anonymity set of the users claiming incentives, as in the case when both the
Rewarder and Reputation Holder are corrupted.
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VerifyIncent(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, gpk)→ {0, 1}: performed by the Reputation Holder when receiving an in-
centive claim σ from user uid on incentives t1, · · · , tk. Outputs 1 if the incentive claim is valid on
uid, t1, · · · tk and 0 otherwise.
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk1 , t1, · · · , tk2 , gpk)→ r′′[uid, l]: performed by the Reputation Holder with input
a user uid, k1 valid incentive claims σ1, · · ·σk1 and k2 incentives t1, · · · , tk2 . Outputs r′′[uid, l] = f1(k1)
if no incentive has been claimed twice, and otherwise ⊥.
Allocate reputation for next round For the first round, all users’ reputations are set to an initial
value. The reputation of user uid for round l + 1, r[uid, l + 1], is set by the Reputation Holder as
f2(r
′[uid, l], r′′[uid, l], r[uid, l]) combining the user’s previous reputation and the two intermediate values
r′[uid, l], r′′[uid, l]. This reputation value r[uid, l + 1], which we refer to as r, and a reputation token ω
obtained from AllocateRep are given to the user via a secure authenticated channel to allow them to prove
they have this reputation in the next round.
AllocateRep(uid, r, l, rhsk, reg)→ ω: performed by the Reputation Holder with input a user uid with
reputation r during round l, the Reputation Holder’s secret key rhsk and the registration table reg.
Outputs reputation token ω.
2.1 Security Requirements
An APR system must satisfy Correctness, as well as the following security requirements: Anonymity of
Ratings under Full Corruption, which formalises the strongest anonymity that can be achieved when
the Rewarder and Reputation Holder are corrupted; Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation
Holder, which ensures that ratings cannot be de-anonymised or linked by the Reputation Holder7; Trace-
ability, which ensures that multiple ratings cannot be given on the same user per round; Non–Frameability,
which ensures that users cannot be impersonated when giving ratings or claiming incentives; Unforgeabil-
ity of Reputation, which ensures that a user cannot lie about their reputation, and Fair Rewards, which
ensures that users can only successfully claim for the number of incentives they were awarded.
We provide definitions in the computational model of cryptography. These are typically formulated as
experiments in which an adversary, having access to a certain number of oracles, is challenged to produce
an output. Such an output captures an instance of the system in which the security requirement does
not hold. In Figure 2, we provide the oracles used in our security requirements: AddU, SndToU, SndToRH,
AllocateRep, USK, Rate, TD, Incent, Collect, based on notation from [6]. We note that cont, accept
and reject are as defined in the decription of 〈Join, Issue〉. We give a high level description below:
– AddU (Add User): creates an honest user uid.
– SndToU (Send to User): creates honest users when the adversary has corrupted the Reputation Holder.
The adversary impersonates the RH, and engages in a < Join, Issue > protocol with an honest user.
– SndToRH (Send to RH): creates corrupted users, when the adversary has not corrupted the Reputation
Holder. The adversary impersonates a user and engages in a < Join, Issue > protocol with an honest
RH.
– AllocateRep: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of AllocateRep.
– USK: allows an adversary to obtain the secret key of an honest user.
– Rate: allows an adversary to perform Rate on behalf of an honest user.
– TD: allows an adversary to obtain a trapdoor associated to a rating that has been obtained through
the Rate oracle.
– Incent: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of Incent.
– Collect: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of CollectIncent for a rating that has been output by
the Rate oracle and then input to the Incent oracle.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state which are initially set to ∅:
HL List of uids of honest users. New honest users can be added by queries to the AddU oracle (for an
honest RH) or SndToU oracle (for a corrupt RH).
7 The case of a corrupt Rewarder is captured in the Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption requirement.
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CL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. New corrupt users can be added through
the SndToRH oracle if the RH is honest. If the RH is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
AL List of all queries to the AllocateRep oracle for corrupt users.
SL List of queries and outputs from the Rate oracle.
TDL List of queries to the TD oracle.
IL List of queries, and outputs of the Incent oracle.
CLL List of queries, and outputs of the Collect oracle.
Correctness An APR system is correct, if when Rate is input an honestly generated secret key and a
reputation token, it will output a valid rating. Provided all ratings input to FormRep1 originate from
different users it will output the correct function. Also, if Incent and CollectIncent are performed honestly
on k valid ratings, the resulting incentive claims will be valid. Provided each incentive is only claimed
once, FormRep2 will output f1(k). We give the full requirement in Appendix A.
AddU(uid):
if uid ∈ CL ∪ HL return ⊥
HL← HL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont,gsk[uid]←⊥
Stuidjn ← (gpk), Stuidiss ← (rhsk, gpk, uid),Mjn ←⊥
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
While decuid = cont
(Stuidiss ,Mjn, dec
uid)←$ Issue(Stuidiss ,Miss)
If decuid = accept reg[uid]← Stuidiss
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
gsk[uid]← Stuidjn , return reg[uid]
SndToU(uid,Min):
if uid /∈ HL
HL← HL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥, Stuidjn ← gpk
(Stuidjn ,Mout, dec)←$ Join(Stuidjn ,Min)
if dec = accept gsk[uid]← Stuidjn
return (Mout, dec)
SndToRH(uid,Min):
if uid ∈ HL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CL CL← CL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidIssue undefined st
uid
Issue ← (rhsk, gpk)
(Stuidiss ,Mout, dec
uid)←$ Issue(Stuidiss ,Min)
if decuid = accept
reg[uid]← Stuidiss return (Mout, reg[uid])
else return Mout
USK(uid):
if uid /∈ HL return ⊥ else return (gsk[uid])
AllocateRep(uid, r, l):
if uid ∈ CL AL← AL ∪ (uid, r, l)
return ω ← AllocateRep(uid, r, l, rhsk, reg)
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(ρ, td)←$Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l}, return ρ
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
if (·, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l) ∈ SL TDL← TDL ∪ {((fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)} return td
else return ⊥
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| > 1 return ⊥
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| = 1
/ Check if challenge rating is input in anon-rh game, otherwise RL† = ∅
Parse RL† = {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l
∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}
k ← k + 1, (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk)← (fb∗, uid′
∗
, r∗, ρ∗1−b)
/ Rating from other challenged user added to the inputs
t1, · · · , tk ←
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, ·) /∈ IL IL← IL ∪ (ti, (fbi, uidi, ri, ρi))
choose random permutation Π, return tΠ(1), · · · , tΠ(k)
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
if |{(uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) : i ∈ [k]} ∩ RL| = 1
/ Check if challenge rating is input in anon-fullcorr game, otherwise RL = ∅
Parse RL = {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l
∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}, k ← k + 1
(uidk, uid
′
k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk)← (uid∗1−b, uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗1−b, td∗1−b)
/ Rating from other challenged user added to the inputs
tk ← Incent((fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k]
σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
Fig. 2: Oracles used in our Security Requirements
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Anonymity of Ratings We now give the requirements for both corruption settings that ensure ratings
cannot be de-anonymised or linked by user, provided multiple ratings on the same user per round are
not given. We also must ensure that ratings cannot be linked to the corresponding incentive claim. This
is crucial to ensuring ratings are anonymous, as incentive claims are sent fully authenticated and so, if
linkable to the corresponding rating, they could be used to de-anonymise such ratings.
Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption. We first formally define anonymity of ratings in the case
both the Rewarder and the Reputation Holder have been corrupted. In this setting, the following attack
can always be mounted: The adversary, having corrupted the Rewarder and Reputation Holder, wishes
to de-anonymise a specific rating and so simply only rewards this rating. The author of the rating then
claims their reward from the Reputation Holder, revealing their identity. Such an attack is unavoidable
when incentivising accurate feedback.
However, we can still provide some guarantee of anonymity, namely that the adversary should learn
no more than the following: a user that has been rewarded n times per round is responsible for n of the
rewarded ratings for that round. When n = 1 the above attack still holds, but this dishonest behaviour of
the Rewarder can be detected as only one incentive would be publicly broadcast. Our security requirement
achieves this by allowing the challenge rating to be input to the Collect oracle, on the condition that
an additional rating authored by the other challenged user is added to the inputs. By including ratings
originating from both challenged users, the incentives claimed by both of these users will increase by 1,
and so the adversary cannot use this to trivially win. We note that this notion implies the anonymity
requirement when just the Rewarder is corrupted, i.e., it is the strongest of the two requirements.
In the security game the Reputation Holder and Rewarder are corrupted, and so the adversary can
create corrupted users. The adversary chooses two honest users, as well as a feedback, a user who is
the subject of the feedback, and a reputation. The adversary must give reputation tokens for each user
for this reputation. The adversary is returned with a challenge rating authored by one of these users,
with this reputation, on this feedback and user (subject), and they must guess which user authored the
rating. The challenge rating as well as another rating authored by the other challenged user is saved in
RL, for later use in the Collect oracle. The adversary can create honest users with the SndToU oracle
and obtain their ratings with the Rate oracle. However they cannot query to the Rate oracle either of
the users that were challenged as well as the challenge subject/round. Otherwise the FormRep1 algorithm
could be used to trivially win, due to the detection of multiple ratings on the same user/round. We also
must check that both ratings computed from the challenged users are valid, to ensure that both ω0 or
ω1 output by the adversary were correctly formed. The adversary can also reveal the trapdoor from each
Rate oracle query with the TD oracle, but not for the challenge ratings as this would lead to a trivial win
by detecting double claims with FormRep2. They also have access to an Incent oracle. The adversary
can query incentives from the Incent oracle, that originate from the Rate oracle, to the Collect oracle.
If they include the challenge rating, an additional rating from the other challenged user is added to the
inputs. The adversary is returned with the incentive claims for these ratings along with the user who
claims them. This captures the fact that claiming incentives should not violate the anonymity of ratings.
We give the full game below:
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Experiment: Expanon-fullcorrA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
b←$ {0, 1},RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk, rwsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′
∗
, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
/ Compute both ratings for use in Collect oracle and to check ω0, ω1
RL← {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l
∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}} / Save both ratings for use in Collect
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
/ Check ω0, ω1 are both valid and FormRep1 can’t be used to trivially win by detecting multiple ratings
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
An APR system satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption if for all functions f1, f2, for
all polynomial time adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible in τ :
|Pr[Expanon−fullcorrA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1]− 1/2|.
Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder. We next define anonymity in the setting
where the Reputation Holder has been corrupted, but not the Rewarder. This means that the adversary
now does not know which ratings have been rewarded. The challenge rating and a rating authored by
the other challenged user are now stored in list RL†. The adversary has full access to the Collect oracle,
modelling the role of the Reputation Holder. However, if the challenge rating is input to the Incent
oracle, the rating authored by the other challenged user stored in RL† is also added to the inputs. The
Incent oracle shuffles the outputs. This represents that the Reputation Holder no longer knows which
rating is linked to each incentive.
Experiment: Expanon-rhA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
b←$ {0, 1},RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′
∗
, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
/ Compute both ratings for use in Incent oracle and to check ω0, ω1
RL† ← {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l
∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}} / Save both ratings for use in Incent
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
/ Check ω0, ω1 are both valid and FormRep1 can’t be used to trivially win by detecting multiple ratings
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
An APR system satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder if for all f1, f2,
for all polynomial time adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible in τ :
|Pr[Expanon−rhA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1]− 1/2|.
Fair Rewards This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot increase the number of incentives
they were allocated, or steal incentives allocated to other users.
In the security game the Rewarder and the Reputation Holder are corrupted, so the adversary can
create corrupted users. The adversary is given the SndToU and Rate oracles to create honest users, and
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obtain their ratings. They have access to the Collect oracles to obtain incentive claims on incentives
obtained from the Rate oracle followed by the Incent oracle. They have access to the trapdoor oracle, to
obtain trapdoors associated to ratings output by Rate. The adversary must choose k1 incentives obtained
from the Incent oracle, and k2 valid incentive claims, not output by the Collect oracle, corresponding
to a single user identifier. If FormRep2 doesn’t detect cheating, and more incentive claims are output
than incentives corresponding to ratings not obtained through the Rate oracle or queried to the trapdoor
oracle, then the adversary wins. We give the full game below:
An APR system satisfies Fair Rewards if for all functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries
A, the advantage Pr[Expfair−rewA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: Expfair−rewA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
RL,RL† ← ∅, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, (σ1, · · ·σk2), (t1, · · · tk1), l)←$A
SndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
if ∃i ∈ [k1] s.t (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return 0
return 1 if the following conditions hold
∀i ∈ [k2] σi not returned by Collect oracle and VerifyIncent(uid, σi, (t1, · · · , tk1)) = 1 and
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk2 , t1, · · · tk1 , gpk) 6=⊥ and
k2 > |{i ∈ [k1] : (·, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) /∈ SL or (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi) ∈ TDL}|
Traceability This requirement ensures that only registered users can give ratings, and multiple ratings
on the same user during the same round can be detected.
In the security game the adversary has corrupted the RW, but not corrupted the RH as otherwise
they would be able to arbitrarily create new user secret keys. The adversary has access to the AddU oracle
to create honest users, the Rate oracle to obtain their ratings and the TD oracle to obtain the associated
trapdoors. They also can create corrupted users with the SndToRH oracle. They can obtain reputation
tokens with the AllocateRep oracle. The adversary must output more valid ratings on the same user, for
the same round, than the number of corrupt users, without using the Rate oracle, such that FormRep1
will not detect multiple feedback. We give the full game below:
Experiment: ExptraceA,APR(τ, f1, f2)
param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid′, l, (fb1, r1, ρ1), · · · (fbk, rk, ρk)←$A,AddU,SndToRH,AllocateRep,Rate,TD1 (gpk, rwsk)
return 1 if the following conditions hold
∀i ∈ [1, k] (·, uid′, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) /∈ SL and k > |CL| and
∀i ∈ [1, k] Verify(fbi, uid′, l, ri, ρi, gpk) = 1 and
FormRep1((uid′, l, (fb1, r1, ρ1), · · · (fbk, rk, ρk), gpk) 6=⊥
An APR system satisfies Traceability if for all functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries A,
the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,APR(τ, f1, f2) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Non–Frameability This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot impersonate an honest user.
This requires firstly that an adversary should not be able to output a valid rating that links to the
rating of an honest user under FormRep1, causing this rating to be discarded. Secondly an adversary
should not be able to produce a valid incentive claim, that links to the incentive claim of an honest user
under FormRep2, and so causes this claim to be discarded. For ease of notation, the two requirements are
captured with two separate security games within the same experiment.
In the first security game both the RW and RH are corrupted. The adversary is given the SndToU,
Rate, TD oracles to create honest users, and obtain their ratings and trapdoors. They then must output
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a valid rating, not obtained through the Rate oracle, that links to the rating of an honest user uid under
FormRep1.
In the second security game the RW and RH are again corrupted. The adversary is given the SndToU,
USK, Rate, Incent, Collect oracles to create honest users, reveal their private keys, and obtain their
ratings and trapdoors, as well as to obtain incentive claims from ratings from the Rate oracle. They must
output a valid incentive claim, not returned by the Collect oracle, for an honest user uid, such that it
links to another honestly generated incentive claim, for the same user under FormRep2. We give the full
game below:
Experiment: Expnon-frameA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
return 1 if the following conditions hold
Verify(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, gpk) = 1 and uid ∈ HL and (uid, uid′, fb, r, ·, ·, l) /∈ SL and
∃(uid, uid′, f̂ b, r̂, ρ̂, ·, l) ∈ SL s.t FormRep1(uid′, l, (fb, r, ρ), (f̂ b, r̂, ρ̂), gpk) =⊥
(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, l)←$ASndToU,USK,Rate,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
if ((·, ·, ·, ·), uid, σ, t1, · · · tk, l) ∈ CLL or VerifyIncent(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, gpk) = 0 return 0
if ∃((fb, uid′, r, ρ), uid, σ̂, t′1, · · · t′k′ , l̂) ∈ CLL s.t (fb, uid′, r, ρ) /∈ TDL
and FormRep2(uid, σ, σ̂, t1, · · · tk, gpk) =⊥
return 1
else return 0
An APR system satisfies Non–Frameability if for all functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries
A, the advantage Pr[Expnon−frameA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Unforgeability of Reputation This requirement ensures that users cannot lie about their reputation.
They can only claim to have a particular reputation for a round if they were allocated this by the
Reputation Holder in AllocateRep.
In the security game the RW is corrupted but not the RH, because otherwise the adversary could
perform AllocateRep. The adversary is given the SndToRH oracle to create corrupted users, and the AddU,
Rate and TD oracles to create honest users and obtain their ratings and trapdoors. The AllocateRep
oracle provides them with reputation tokens for honest and corrupted users. The adversary then must
output more valid ratings for a particular reputation, round and user (subject), than the number of queries
for different corrupted users to the AllocateRep oracle for this reputation and round. These ratings must
be unlinkable under FormRep1. Therefore, essentially this requirement ensures that the adversary cannot
use a reputation r more times than the number of corrupted users whose allocated reputation is r. We
give the full game below:
Experiment: Expuf−repA,APR (τ, f1, f2)
param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(r, uid′, l, (fb1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, ρk))←$AAddU,SndToRH,AllocateRep,Rate,TD(gpk, rwsk)
AL∗ ← ∅, ∀uid ∈ CL if (uid, r, l) ∈ AL AL∗ ← AL∗ ∪ {uid}
return 1 if the following conditions hold
∀i ∈ [1, k] Verify(fbi, uid′, l, r, ρi, gpk) = 1 and k > |AL∗| and
FormRep1(uid′, l, (fb1, r, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, r, ρk), gpk) 6=⊥ and
∀i ∈ [1, k] (·, uid′, fbi, r, ρi, ·, l) /∈ SL
An APR system satisfies Unforgeability of Reputation if for all functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time
adversaries A, the advantage
Pr[Expuf−repA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] is neglible in τ .
11
3 Our Construction
We propose a construction for an APR system which makes use of four building blocks: Linkable Ring Sig-
natures (LRS), a modified Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA*) scheme, a signature proof of knowledge,
and a public–key encryption scheme.
Ring signatures [52] allow users to sign on behalf of a ring of users, without revealing their identity
within the ring. There is no central entity involved, and users generate their own signing and verification
keys. Linkable ring signatures [42] allow for the public linking of signatures by signer. We exploit these
features to allow for incentivising accurate ratings as follows. Each rating includes a freshly generated
verification key encrypted under the public key of the Rewarder, and the user who has generated the
rating stores the corresponding signing key as a trapdoor. The Rewarder publishes these decrypted
verification keys as incentives. Then to claim an incentive the user uses the signing key to sign a ring
signature on their user identifier with respect to the ring of verification keys given as incentives. The
anonymity of Linkable Ring Signatures ensures that claiming incentives will not de-anonymise ratings.
The unforgeability property ensures that only users that have been rewarded can claim an incentive, and
the linking function ensures that only one reward can be claimed per rating.
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [13] allows users to sign on behalf of a group, whilst remaining
anonymous within the group. The user-controlled linkability feature, where two signatures on the same
basename by the same user are linked, whilst all other signatures are unlinkable, can be used to detect
multiple feedback on the same subject. In our setting, the basename can be set to be the user who is
the subject of the feedback and the round. In our system we also wish to ensure feedback is weighted by
reputation. However, this must also be balanced with anonymity of feedback. For this to be possible the
reputation of users must be coarse-grained enough that they cannot be identified by their reputation. To
ensure this, we bind reputation into a Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme, which we will call a DAA*
scheme. Now a user proves their reputation when signing, allowing for the weighting of feedback.
3.1 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
Our scheme makes use of a public–key encryption scheme, which consists of the following: EncSetup(1τ ),
which is input the security parameter 1τ and outputs parameters paramEnc;
EncKeyGen(paramEnc), which is input the parameters and outputs secret key sk and the public key pk;
Enc(pk,m), which is input the public key pk and a message m from the message space, and outputs a
ciphertext c; and Dec(sk, c), which is input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m
or a decryption failure ⊥. We require the encryption scheme to be correct and satisfy indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
3.2 Proof Protocols
We follow the notation defined in [16] when referring to zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. For example,
PK{(a, b, c) : y = gahb∧ ỹ = g̃ah̃c} denotes a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of integers a, b and c such
that y = gahb and ỹ = g̃ah̃c hold. SPK denotes a signature proof of knowledge, that is a non-interactive
transformation of a proof PK, e.g., using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] in the random oracle model. Using
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the witness can be extracted from these proofs by rewinding the prover and
programming the random oracle. Alternatively, these proofs can be extended to be online-extractable,
by verifiably encrypting the witness to a public key defined in the common reference string. Clearly this
requires a trusted common reference string. We underline the values that we need to be online-extractable
in our proofs.
We require the proof system to be simulation-sound and zero-knowledge. The latter roughly says that
there must exist a simulator that can generate simulated proofs which are indistinguishable from real
proofs from the view of the adversary. The simulation-soundness is a strengthened version of normal
soundness and guarantees that an adversary, even after having seen simulated proofs of false statements
of his choice, cannot produce a valid proof of a false statement.
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3.3 Linkable Ring Signatures
We use the model in [4] for one-time linkable ring signatures, which gives the strongest security yet.
The scheme from [4] has the shortest signatures to date. We give the security requirements: Correctness
Linkability, Linkable Anonymity, Non–Frameability and Unforgeability in Appendix B.
Definition 1 (Linkable Ring Signatures.). A linkable ring signature scheme LRS is given by polynomial
time algorithms (LRKeyGen, LRSign, LRVerify, LRLink):
LRKeyGen(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter 1τ and outputs a pair (vk, sk) of verification
and signing keys.
LRSign(sk,m,R): takes as input a signing key sk, a message m, and a list of verification keys R =
(vk1, ..., vkq), and outputs a signature Σ.
LRVerify(R,m,Σ): takes as input a ring R = (vk1, ..., vkq), a message m, and a signature Σ, and
outputs either 0 or 1.
LRLink(Σ1, Σ2,m1,m2) : is input two signatures/ messages, outputs 0 or 1.
3.4 DAA* Signatures
The security model of DAA* closely follows that of pre–DAA signatures [7]. We first give the syntax of a
DAA* scheme and then provide the security requirements.
Definition 2 (DAA*.). A DAA* scheme consists of the following algorithms:
DAA*Setup(1τ ): input the security parameter τ , outputs parameters param.
DAA*KeyGen(param): input the parameters param, outputs the group public key gpk, and the issuing
secret key isk.
〈DAA*Join(gpk),DAA*Issue(isk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the group by engaging in an interactive pro-
tocol with the Issuer. The user uid and Issuer perform algorithms DAA*Join and DAA*Issue respectively.
These are input a state and an incoming message respectively, and output an updated state, an outgoing
message, and a decision, either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to DAA*Join is the group public
key, whereas the initial input to DAA*Issue is the issuer secret key, isk, and the group public key. If the
issuer accepts, DAA*Join has a private output of gsk[uid], DAA*Issue has a private output of reg[uid].
DAA*Update(r, t, isk, uid, reg, gpk): input a reputation r, a time t, the issuing secret key isk, a user
uid, the registration list reg, gpk. Outputs a token ω.
DAA*Sign(bsn,m,gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, t): input a basename bsn, a messagem, a user secret key gsk[uid],
a token ω output by DAA*Update, a group public key gpk, a reputation r and time t. It checks that ω is
valid for user uid, reputation r and time t and outputs a signature Ω. Otherwise it outputs ⊥.
DAA*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk): input a basename bsn, a message m, a reputation r, time t, a signature
Ω, and a group public key gpk. It outputs 1 if Ω is valid, and 0 otherwise.
DAA*Link((bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk): input two signaturesΩ0, Ω1 each on a base-
name, a message, a reputation, a time, and a group public key gpk. It outputs 1 if both signatures are
valid, bsn0 = bsn1 and the two signatures have the same author, and 0 otherwise.
DAA*IdentifyT (T , gsk): outputs 1 if T corresponds to a valid transcript of < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue >,
with output gsk to DAA*Join, and otherwise 0.
DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gsk): outputs 1 if the signature Ω could have been produced with user
secret key gsk, and 0 otherwise.
The security requirements for a DAA* scheme are Correctness, Anonymity, Traceability, Non–Frameability,
similarly to in [7], and the additional Unforgeability of Reputation requirement similarly to in [32], which
ensures that a user cannot lie about their reputation.
In Figure 3, we provide the oracles used in our security requirements: AddU, SndToU, SndToI, USK,
GSig, Update. We give a high level decription below:
– AddU: creates an honest user uid
– SndToU: creates honest users when the adversary has corrupted the issuer. The adversary impersonates
an issuer, and engages in a < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > protocol with an honest user.
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AddU(uid):
if uid ∈ CL ∪ HL return ⊥
HL← HL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont,gsk[uid]←⊥
Stuidjn ← (gpk), Stuidiss ← (isk, gpk, uid),Mjn ←⊥
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$DAA*Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
While decuid = cont
(Stuidiss ,Mjn, dec
uid)←$DAA*Issue(Stuidiss ,Miss)
If decuid = accept reg[uid]← Stuidiss
(Stuidjn ,Miss, dec
uid)←$DAA*Join(Stuidjn ,Mjn)
gsk[uid]← Stuidjn , return reg[uid]
SndToU(uid,Min):
if uid /∈ HL
HL← HL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥, Stuidjn ← gpk
(Stuidjn ,Mout, dec
uid)←$DAA*Join(Stuidjn ,Min)




if uid ∈ HL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CL CL← CL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if Stuidiss undefined St
uid
iss ← (isk, gpk)
(Stuidiss ,Mout, dec
uid)←$DAA*Issue(Stuidiss ,Min)
if decuid = accept reg[uid]← Stuidiss return (Mout, reg[uid])
else return Mout
USK(uid):
if uid /∈ HL return ⊥ else BL← BL ∪ {uid} return gsk[uid]
GSig(bsn,m, uid, r, t, ω):
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
Ω ← DAA*Sign(bsn,m,gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, t)
SL← SL ∪ {uid,m, r, t, bsn,Ω} return Ω
Update(uid, t, r):
UL← UL ∪ (uid, t, r) return ω ← DAA*Update(r, t, isk, uid, reg, gpk)
Fig. 3: Oracles used in our DAA* security requirements
– SndToI: creates corrupted users when the adversary has not corrupted the issuer. The adversary
impersonates a user and engages in a < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > protocol with the honest issuer.
– USK: allows an adversary to obtain the secret key of an honest user.
– GSig: allows an adversary to perform DAA*Sign on behalf of an honest user.
– Update: allows an adversary to obtain outputs of DAA*Update.
Correctness In Figure 4, ExpcorrA,DAA*(τ) gives the Correctness requirement. This ensures that given a
user is honestly joined to the scheme, and DAA*Update and DAA*Sign are performed correctly, with the
user private key resulting from the user’s join protocol, then the signature output will verify correctly.
It also ensures that signatures generated honestly using the same user private key and basename will
be linked under DAA*Link, and that DAA*IdentifyS and DAA*IdentifyT correctly identify signatures to
the user private key and the transcript respectively. This requirement only differs from [7], because the
correctness of DAA*Update needs to be included.
A DAA* scheme satisfies correctness, if for all polynomial time adversaries A, the advantage
Pr[ExpcorrA,DAA*(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Anonymity In Figure 4, ExpanonA,DAA*(τ) gives the anonymity requirement. This ensures that a user’s sig-
natures cannot be de-anonymised, and signatures with different basenames but the same signer cannot
be linked. In the security game the adversary has corrupted the issuer. They choose two honest users
and a message, basename, reputation and time, as well as providing valid update tokens for both users
for the reputation and time given. They are returned with a challenge signature and they must guess
which of the two users was the author. They can create honest users using the SndToU oracle, obtain
their signatures with the GSig oracle and corrupt them with the USK oracle. However they cannot corrupt
either of the challenged honest users, or query one of these users and the challenge basename to GSig, as
otherwise the DAA*Link algorithm could be used to trivially win.
This requirement differs from [7] because of the tokens provided by the adversary for both users. As
the adversary has corrupted the issuer, we allow them to provide the update tokens for both users that
are input to DAA*Sign. However, to avoid trivial wins, they fail if either would output ⊥ under DAA*Sign
and so are invalid.
A DAA* scheme satisfies anonymity, if for all polynomial time adversaries A, the advantage
|Pr[ExpanonA,DAA*(τ) = 1]− 1/2| is negiglible in τ .
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Experiment: ExpcorrA,DAA*(τ)
param←$DAA*Setup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAA*KeyGen(param),HL,CL← ∅
(uid,m0, r0, t0,m1, r1, t1, bsn)←$AAddU(param, gpk)
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
∀b ∈ {0, 1} ωb ← DAA*Update(rb, tb, isk, uid, reg, gpk), Ωb ←$DAA*Sign(bsn,mb,gsk[uid], ωb, gpk, rb, tb)
∀b ∈ {0, 1} if DAA*Verify(bsn,mb, rb, tb, Ωb, gpk) = 0 return 1
if bsn 6=⊥ if DAA*Link((bsn,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk) = 0 return 1
if DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m0, r0, t0, Ω0,gsk[uid]) = 0 return 1
Let T denote the < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > transcript for user uid
if DAA*IdentifyT (T ,gsk[uid]) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Experiment: ExpanonA,DAA*(τ)
b←$ {0, 1}, param←$DAA*Setup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAA*KeyGen(param),HL,BL, SL← ∅
(st, uid0, uid1, bsn,m, r, t, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,USK,GSig(choose, param, gpk, isk)
if uid0, uid1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid0],gsk[uid1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b ∈ {0, 1} Ωb ←$DAA*Sign(bsn,m,gsk[uidb], ωb, gpk, r, t)
d←$ASndToU,USK,GSig(guess, st, Ωb)
if ∃b such that Ωb =⊥ or either uid0, uid1 ∈ BL or (uid0, ·, ·, ·, bsn, ·), (uid1, ·, ·, ·, bsn, ·) ∈ SL
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Experiment: ExptraceA,DAA*(τ)
param←$DAA*Setup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAA*KeyGen(param),HL,CL,UL← ∅
(Ω,m, bsn, r, t, gsk1, · · · , gskl)←$ASndToI,Update(param, gpk)
Let T denote the set of all transcripts accepted from SndToI queries
If the following conditions hold return 1
1. DAA*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk) = 1
2. ∀T ∈ T ∃i ∈ [1, l] such that DAA*IdentifyT (T , gski) = 1
3. ∀i ∈ [1, l] DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gski) = 0
(bsn,m0,m1, r0, r1, t0, t1, Ω0, Ω1, gsk)←$A(param, gpk, isk)
if bsn =⊥ return 0
If the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1. ∀b ∈ {0, 1} DAA*Verify(bsn,mb, rb, tb, Ωb, gpk) = 1
2. ∀b ∈ {0, 1} DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,mb, rb, tb, Ωb, gsk) = 1
3. DAA*Link((bsn,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk) = 0
Fig. 4: Experiments capturing the correctness, anonymity and traceability security requirements for DAA*
Traceability In Figure 4, ExptraceA,DAA*(τ) gives the traceability requirement. This requirement ensures firstly
that all signatures identify under DAA*IdentifyS to a secret key obtained through a< DAA*Join,DAA*Issue >
protocol, and secondly that signatures that identify to the same secret key under DAA*IdentifyS and have
the same basename are always linked under DAA*Link.
In the first security game the adversary has not corrupted the issuer as otherwise they could simply
create their own unregistered users. They are given the SndToI oracle to create corrupt users, and the
Update oracle, so they can obtain tokens. They then must output a secret key corresponding to every
accepted SndToI query under DAA*IdentifyT , and a valid signature that does not identify to any of these
secret keys under DAA*IdentifyS .
In the second security game the adversary has corrupted the issuer. They must output a basename,
user secret key, and two valid signatures on this basename. They win if the two signatures are not linked
under DAA*Link but do identify to the same secret key.
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Experiment: Expnon-frameA,DAA* (τ)
param←$DAA*Setup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAA*KeyGen(param),HL,BL, SL← ∅
(bsn,m, uid, r, t, Ω)←$ASndToU,USK,GSig(param, gpk, isk)
If the following conditions hold return 1
1. DAA*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk) = 1
2. uid ∈ HL\BL
3. (uid,m, r, t, bsn,Ω) /∈ SL
4. DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω,gsk[uid]) = 1.
(bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0, bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1, gsk)←$A(param, gpk, isk)
If one of the following conditions hold return 0
1. ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that DAA*Verify(bsnb,mb, rb, tb, Ωb, gpk) = 0
2. DAA*Link((bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk) = 0
If one of the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1. DAA*IdentifyS(bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0, gsk) = 1 and DAA*IdentifyS(bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1, gsk) = 0
2. bsn0 6= bsn1 or bsn0 =⊥ or bsn1 =⊥
Experiment: Expunforge−repA,DAA* (τ)
(param←$DAA*Setup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAA*KeyGen(param),HL,CL,UL← ∅
(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, uid∗, gsk1, · · · , gskl)←$ASndToI,Update(param, gpk)
Let T denote the set of all transcripts accepted from SndToI queries
Let T denote the transcript corresponding to the SndToI query for user uid∗
KL← ∅, ∀i ∈ [1, l] if DAA*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gski) = 1 KL← KL ∪ {gski}
If the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1. DAA*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk) = 1
2. ∀T ′ ∈ T ∃i ∈ [1, l] such that DAA*IdentifyT (T
′, gski) = 1
3. |KL| = 1, and letting KL = {gsk∗},DAA*IdentifyT (T , gsk
∗) = 1
4. (uid∗, t, r) /∈ UL
Fig. 5: Experiments capturing our Non–Frameability and Unforgeability of Reputation security require-
ments for DAA* signature schemes
The only difference in this requirement from [7] is the additional Update oracle provided to the
adversary.
A DAA* scheme satisfies traceability if, for all polynomial time adversaries A, the advantage
Pr[ExptraceA,DAA*(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Non–Frameability In Figure 5, Expnon-frameA,DAA* (τ) gives the non–frameability requirement. This requirement
ensures that an adversary cannot impersonate an honest user, by forging signatures linking to theirs.
This requires firstly that an adversary should not be able to output a valid signature that identifies to
the secret key of an honest user under DAA*IdentifyS , and secondly that they should not be able to
output two valid linked signatures, that either have different basenames or identify under DAA*IdentifyS
to different secret keys.
In the first security game the adversary has corrupted the issuer. They are given the SndToU, USK, GSig
oracles to create honest users, reveal their private keys, and obtain signatures from these honest users.
They then must output a valid signature, not obtained through GSig, that identifies under DAA*IdentifyS
to the secret key of an honest user, that wasn’t revealed under the USK oracle.
In the second security game the adversary has again corrupted the issuer. They must output two
valid linked signatures and a user secret key. They win if either the basenames of the two signatures are
different or only one of the signatures identifies under DAA*IdentifyS to the secret key.
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A DAA* scheme satisfies non–frameability if, for all polynomial time adversaries A, the advantage
Pr[Expnon−frameA,DAA* (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Unforgeability of Reputation In Figure 5, Expunforge-repA,DAA* (τ) gives the unforgeability of reputation require-
ment. This requirement is new to the DAA* model because of the binding of reputation to signatures. It
ensures that users cannot lie about their reputation, and can only claim to have a particular reputation
at a particular time if they were allocated this by the issuer in DAA*Update.
In the security game the adversary has not corrupted the issuer, because otherwise they could perform
DAA*Update. They are given access to the SndToI oracle to create corrupted users, and the Update oracle.
They then must output a secret key corresponding to every accepted SndToI query under DAA*IdentifyT ;
a valid signature for reputation r, time t, that only identifies to one of these secret keys gsk∗ under
DAA*IdentifyS ; and an honest user uid
∗ that identifies to gsk∗ under DAA*IdentifyT , without using the
Update oracle for (uid∗, r, t).
A DAA* scheme satisfies unforgeability of reputation if, for all polynomial time adversaries A, the
advantage Pr[Expunforge−repA,DAA* (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
3.5 Our Construction
We now present our construction that securely realizes an APR system, using a PKE scheme, an SPK, an
LRS scheme and a DAA* scheme. We give our construction in Figure 6, except for the joining protocol
which we describe as follows: The APR joining protocol is 〈DAA*Join(gpk),DAA*Issue(rhsk, rhpk)〉, with
the following modification. The last message sent by the user should additionally include π = SPK{(gsk) :
DAA*IdentifyT (T , gsk) = 1}, where T is the transcript of the protocol so far. The issuer must verify this
proof before proceeding as usual.
Setup(1τ , f1, f2)
return (DAA*Setup(1τ ),EncSetup(1τ ), f1, f2)
RHKeyGen(paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2)
(rhsk, rhpk)←$DAA*KeyGen(paramDAA*) return (rhsk, rhpk)
RWKeyGen(paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$EncKeyGen(paramEnc) return (rwsk, rwpk)
Rate(gsk[uid], gpk, fb, uid′, l, r, ω)
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk)
Ω←$DAA*Sign((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk),gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, l), ρ← (Ω, ṽk)
Verify(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ = (Ω, ṽk), gpk)
DAA*Verify((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk), r, l, Ω, gpk)
FormRep1(uid, l, (fb1, r1, (Ω1, ˜vk1)), · · · , (fbk, rk, (Ωk, ˜vkk)), gpk)





Incent({(fbi, uidi, ri, (Ωi, ˜vki)) : i ∈ [k]}, l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k] ti ← Dec(rwsk, ˜vki) return (t1, · · · , tk)
CollectIncent(uid, (fb, uid′, l, r, ρ, td), t1, · · · , tk, gpk)
return σ←$ LRSign(td, uid, (t1, · · · tk))
VerifyIncent(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, gpk)
return LRVerify((t1, · · · tk), uid, σ)
FormRep2(uid, σ1, · · ·σk1 , t1, · · · , tk2 , gpk) // Note that inputs t1, · · · , tk2 are not necessary for this particular construction as the ring is not input to LRLink.
∀i, j ∈ [k1] s.t i 6= j if LRLink(σi, σj , uid, uid) = 1 return ⊥ else return f1(k1)
AllocateRep(uid, r[uid, l], l, isk, reg)
return DAA*Update(r[uid, l], l, isk, uid, reg, gpk)
Fig. 6: All algorithms in our APR construction
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4 Security of Our Construction
We show that our construction satisfies the security requirements for an APR system defined in Section 2.
Theorem 1. The construction presented in Figure 6 is a secure APR, as defined in Section 2, if the LRS
scheme, DAA* scheme and PKE scheme used are secure, and the SPK is online extractable, simulation
sound, and zero-knowledge.
The correctness of DAA* ensures that honestly generated ratings will verify correctly and FormRep1
will output the correct function. The correctness of the encryption scheme and LRS scheme ensure that,
if Incent and CollectIncent are performed honestly on k valid ratings, the resulting incentive claims will
be valid, and that FormRep2 will output the correct function. Therefore, our APR construction satisfies
correctness.
We now give detailed proofs of Lemmata 1-6, which ensure our construction satisfies: Anonymity of
Ratings under Full Corruption, Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder, Traceability,
Non–Frameability, Unforgeability of Reputation, and Fair Rewards.
Lemma 1. The construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under Full–Corruption if the LRS and DAA*
schemes satisfy Anonymity, and the SPK is zero-knowledge.
Proof. Assuming the LRS scheme satisfies Linkable Anonymity, the DAA* scheme used also satisfies
Anonymity and the SPK is zero knowledge, then the APR construction satisfies the Anonymity of Ratings
under Full Corruption requirement.
We define Game 0 to be the Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption experiment, with b chosen
randomly at the beginning, using the APR construction. Let S0 be the event that an adversary A correctly
guesses b after Game 0.
We define Game 1 to be identical to Game 0 except for in the Collect oracle, with probability 1/2
the user identifiers of the challenge rating and the additional rating will be swapped. We give Game 1 in
Figure 7. Let S1 be the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 1.
We show that Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable assuming the linkable anonymity of the LRS
scheme used in our construction. We give a distinguishing algorithm D for functions f1, f2 in Figure 8,
and below explain why D simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically to in Game 0 if in the
linkable anonymity experiment the bit b = 0 was chosen, and D simulates inputs to A that are distributed
identically to in Game 1 if in the Linkable anonymity experiment the bit b was chosen randomly.
Clearly all inputs to A other than the Collect oracle and ρ∗0, ρ∗1 are identical in both Game 0 and
1. ρ∗0 and ρ
∗
1 are distributed identically in both Game 0 and Game 1 because
˜vk∗0 ,
˜vk∗1 are encrypted
honestly generated verification keys for ring signatures, and Ω∗0 , Ω
∗
1 are computed identically. RL is defined
identically to in Game 0, except that as the trapdoor is unknown, instead this is set to (⊥, b′). If the
challenge signature is queried to the Collect oracle, then these trapdoors cannot be used in CollectIncent.
Therefore instead the challenge oracle is used from the linkable anonymity game for ring signatures. If
b = 0 was chosen in the linkable anonymity game, then this will return a correctly distributed incentive
claim as in Game 0. If b is chosen randomly in the linkable anonymity game, then the incentive will be
generated from the correct user’s key, with the same probability as in Game 1.
Therefore the probability that D outputs 1 given b = 0 in the Linkable Anonymity game is Pr[S0].
The probability that D outputs 1 given the bit was chosen randomly in the Linkable Anonymity game
is Pr[S1]. Let s
∗ be the probability D outputs 1 given b = 1 in the Linkable Anonymity game. Then
Pr[S1] = 1/2s
∗ + 1/2 Pr[S0], and so s
∗ = 2 Pr[S1] − Pr[S0]. Therefore, the advantage of D is then
|2 Pr[S1] − Pr[S0] − Pr[S0]| = 2|Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]|. Therefore |Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]| = ε/2, where ε is the ad-
vantage of an adversary in the Linkable Anonymity security game. Therefore, provided the linkable ring
signature scheme satisfies Linkable Anonymity, Games 0 and Games 1 will be indistinguishable.
Next, we show that |Pr[S1]−1/2| ≤ εDAA*,anon, where εDAA*,anon is the advantage in breaking anonymity
for the DAA* scheme. We build an adversary A′, that breaks Anonymity for the DAA* scheme, given A
for functions f1, f2 that successfully guesses b in Game 1 with Pr[S1]. We give A′ in Figure 9, and below
explain why the simulation input to A given in Figure 9 is identically distributed to Game 1, and why
A′ successfully breaks Anonymity for the DAA* scheme.
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Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
if |{(uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) : i ∈ [k]} ∩ RL| = 1
k ← k + 1
(uidk, uid
′
k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk)← (uid∗1−b+b′′ , uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗1−b, td∗1−b)
tk ← Incent((fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k]
σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
Game 1
b, b′′, d′ ←$ {0, 1}, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk, rwsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′
∗
, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
RL← {(uid∗b′′+b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l
∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
d← d′
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Fig. 7: Game 1
We first show inputs to A are identically distributed to in Game 1. (gpk, rwsk, rhsk) is identical to in
Game 1, because (rhpk, rhsk) and (gpkDAA*, isk) are identically distributed.
The SndToU oracles in both the Anonymity of DAA* security requirement and the Anonymity of
Ratings requirement are identical, and the < Join, Issue > protocol are identical for the DAA* scheme and
the APR construction, except for the SPK that can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property.
Therefore the SndToU oracle is distributed identically to in Game 1. The Rate oracle is also distributed
identically in Game 1, because (vk, td) are computed identically, and GSig will output DAA* signatures
as in Rate.
The TD and Incent oracles are identical to in Game 1. We note that RL is input to Collect. For ρ∗,
the entry in RL is identical to in Game 1. For the other signature, ˜vk′ and td′ are generated identically
to Rate, the only difference is the DAA* signature is set to be ⊥. However this is not used in Incent or
CollectIncent. Therefore, the Collect oracle is distributed identically.
ρ∗ is distributed identically in Game 1, because (vk∗, td∗) are chosen identically, and A′ is returned
with a DAA* signature for either uid0 or uid1.
If A wins with probability greater than 1/2, they output ω1, ω1 so that Ω∗0 , Ω∗1 6=⊥. Therefore as
A′ also outputs ω1, ω1 then they will not fail because of this. A′ never queries the USK oracle. If A wins
with probability greater than 1/2, they never query (uid∗0, uid
′∗, l∗, ·, ·, ·) or (uid∗1, uid′
∗
, l∗, ·, ·, ·) to the
Rate oracle, and therefore A′ never queries ((uid′∗, l∗), ·, uid∗1, ·, ·, ·) or ((uid′
∗
, l∗), ·, uid∗0, ·, ·, ·) to the GSig
oracle. A′ successfully guesses b, if A has successfully guessed b. Therefore Pr[S1]− 1/2| ≤ εDAA*,anon, and
so our construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under Full Corruption.
Lemma 2. The construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder if the
DAA* scheme satisfies Anonymity and the PKE scheme satisfies indistinguishability under adaptive cho-
sen ciphertext attacks, and the SPK is zero-knowledge.
19
SndToU(uid,Min)
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
As in original security game
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
As in original security game
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
if |{(uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) : i ∈ [k]} ∩ RL| = 1
k ← k + 1
(uidk, uid
′
k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk)← (uid∗1−b, uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗1−b, td∗1−b)
tk ← Incent((fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k]
if tdi = (⊥, b′) σi ←$ Chal(b′, uidi, t1, · · · , tk)
else σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
DAddURS(τ, f1, f2)
b, d′ ←$ {0, 1}, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk, rwsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥




b′ ← (⊥, b′)
Ω∗b′ ←$DAA*Sign((uid′
∗
, l∗), (fb∗, ˜vk∗b′),gsk[uid
∗
b′ ], ωb′ , gpk, r
∗, l∗)
RL← {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗





∗) : b′ ∈ {0, 1}}
return (st, 0, 1)
DChal(st)
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ( ˜vk∗b , Ω
∗
b ))
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL d← d′
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Fig. 8: D a distinguishing algorithm that breaks the Anonymity of Linkable Ring Signatures
Proof. Assuming the encryption scheme used is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen ciphertext at-
tacks, the DAA* scheme used also satisfies Anonymity, and the SPK is zero knowledge then the APR
construction satisfies the Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder requirement.
We define Game 0 to be the Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder experiment,
with b chosen randomly at the beginning, using the APR construction. Let S0 be the event that an
adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 0.
We define Game 1 to be identical to Game 0 except for in the Collect oracle, with probability 1/2
the user identifiers of the challenge rating and the additional rating will be swapped. We give Game 1 in
Figure 10. Let S1 be the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 1.
We show that Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable for all functions f1, f2, assuming the ind–
cca2 security of the encryption scheme used in our construction. We give a distinguishing algorithm D
in Figure 11, and below explain why D simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically in Game 0
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SndToU(uid,Min)
Mout ← SndToUDAA*(uid,Min), if final message simulate π with transcript T return (Mout, π) else return Mout
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
As in original security game
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
if |{(uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) : i ∈ [k]} ∩ RL| = 1
k ← k + 1
(uidk, uid
′
k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk)← (uid∗b′′−1, uid′∗, fb∗, r∗, (⊥, ˜vk′), td′)
tk ← Incent((fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k]
σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk), Ω←$ GSig((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk), uid, r, l, ω), ρ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l}, return ρ
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig(choose, paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)← (isk, gpkDAA*),








, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk, rwsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk∗, td∗)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk∗ ←$Enc(rwpk, vk∗)





′∗, l∗), (fb∗, ˜vk∗), r∗, l∗, ω0, ω1)
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig(guess, stA′ , Ω∗)
ρ∗ ← (Ω∗, ˜vk∗), (vk′, td′)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ˜vk′ ←$Enc(rwpk, vk′), b′′ ←$ {0, 1}
RL← {(uid∗b′′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗, td∗, l∗), (uid∗b′′−1, uid
′∗, fb∗, r∗, (⊥, ˜vk′), td′, l∗)}
return ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, stA, ρ∗)
Fig. 9: A′ breaks Anonymity of the DAA* scheme using A
if in the ind-cca2 experiment the bit b = 0 was chosen, and D simulates inputs to A that are distributed
identically in Game 1 if in the ind–cca2 experiment the bit b was chosen randomly.
Clearly all inputs to A other than the Incent, Collect oracles and ρ∗b are identical in both Game 0
and 1, because rwpk is a public key of the encryption scheme. ρ∗b is distributed identically in both Game
0 and Game 1 because ˜vk∗b is an encrypted honestly generated verification key for ring signatures, and
Ω∗b is computed identically. Only the challenge rating is included in RL
† and as the trapdoor is unknown,
instead this is set to ⊥. However, these missing entries will not be used later. If the challenge signature is
queried to the Incent oracle, then the decryption oracle cannot be used in the ind–cca2 game. Therefore,
instead incentives corresponding to both of the ring signature verification keys vk∗0 , vk
∗
1 will be output
corresponding to the challenge signature and the added extra signature of the other challenged user. All
other incentives are generated using the decryption oracle. If either of the incentives vk∗0 , vk
∗
1 are queried
to the Collect oracle, then the corresponding trapdoors can be used in CollectIncent. The user uid∗b
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Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k]
if ti = t
∗
b′ s.t b
′ ∈ {0, 1} σi ←$CollectIncent(uid∗b′+b′′ , (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
else σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
Game 1
b, b′′ ←$ {0, 1}, param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , ρ∗b′)←$Rate(gsk[uid∗b′ ], gpk, fb∗, uid′
∗
, l∗, r∗, ωb′)
RL† ← {(uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗b′ , td
∗
b′ , l





, r∗, ρ∗0), (fb
∗, uid′
∗
, r∗, ρ∗1), l, rwsk, gpk)
d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ρ∗b)
if ρ∗0 or ρ
∗
1 =⊥ or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL
return d←$ {0, 1}
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Fig. 10: Game 1
claims the incentive vk∗0 and the user uid
∗
1−b claims the incentive vk
∗
1 . If the bit chosen in the ind–cca2
game was 0, then this is identically distributed to in Game 0, because the challenge signature contains
an encryption of vk∗0 . If b is chosen randomly in the ind–cca2 game, then the user claiming the incentive
will be correct with the same probability as in Game 1.
Therefore, the probability that D outputs 1 given the bit is 0 in the ind-cca2 game is Pr[S0]. The
probability that D outputs 1 given the bit was chosen randomly in the ind–cca2 game is Pr[S1]. Let s∗ be
the probability D outputs 1 given the bit was 1 in the ind–cca2 game. Then Pr[S1] = 1/2s∗+ 1/2 Pr[S0],
and so s∗ = 2 Pr[S1] − Pr[S0]. Therefore, the advantage of D is then |2 Pr[S1] − Pr[S0] − Pr[S0]| =
2|Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]|. Therefore |Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]| = ε/2, where ε is the advantage of an adversary in the
ind–cca2 security game. Therefore, provided the encryption scheme is ind–cca2 secure, Games 0 and
Games 1 will be indistinguishable.
Next, we show that |Pr[S1]−1/2| ≤ εDAA*,anon, where εDAA*,anon is the advantage in breaking anonymity
for the DAA* scheme used. We build an adversary A′, that breaks Anonymity for the DAA* scheme used,
given A for functions f1, f2, that successfully guesses b in Game 1 with Pr[S1]. We give A′ in Figure 12,
and below explain why the simulation input to A given in Figure 12 is identically distributed to Game
1, and why A′ successfully breaks Anonymity for the DAA* scheme.
(gpk, rwsk, rhsk) are distributed identically to in Game 1, because (rhpk, rhsk) and (gpkDAA*, isk) are
identically distributed.
The SndToU oracles in both the Anonymity of DAA* security requirement and the Anonymity of
Ratings requirement are identical, and the < Join, Issue > protocol is identical for the DAA* scheme and
the APR construction, except for the SPK that can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property.
Therefore the SndToU oracle is distributed identically in Game 1. The Rate oracle is also distributed
identically in Game 1, because (vk, td) are computed identically, and GSig will output DAA* signatures
as in Rate. The TD is oracles are identical to in Game 1.
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SndToU(uid,Min)
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
As in original security game
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| > 1 return ⊥
if ∃i ∈ [k]| s.t (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†
i∗ ← i, ti ← vk∗0 , tk+1 ← vk∗1
∀i ∈ [k]\{i∗} parse ρi = (Ωi, ṽki) ti ← Decr(ṽki)
∀i ∈ [k + 1] if (ti, ·) /∈ IL IL← IL ∪ (ti, (fbi, uidi, ri, ρi))
choose random permutation Π, return tΠ(1), · · · , tΠ(k+1)
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL ∪ RL ∪ RL† and ti 6= vk∗0 , vk∗1 return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k]
if ti = vk
∗
b′ s.t b
′ ∈ {0, 1} σi ←$CollectIncent(uid∗b+b′ , (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥ td∗b′), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
else σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k
return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
DDecr(paramEnc, pk, f1, f2)
b, d′ ←$ {0, 1}, paramDAA* ←$DAA*Setup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2)






, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
∀b′ ∈ {0, 1} (td∗b′ , vk∗b′)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ )








, l∗), (fb∗, ˜vk∗b ),gsk[uid
∗
b ], ωb, gpk, r
∗, l∗)
RL† ← {(uid∗b , uid′
∗




d←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, st, ( ˜vk∗b , Ω
∗
b ))
if ω0 or ω1 do not return valid ratings or ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1} s.t (uid∗b′ , uid′
∗
, ·, ·, ·, ·, l∗) ∈ SL d← d′
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Fig. 11: D a distinguishing algorithm that breaks the ind–cca2 security of the Encryption scheme
The Incent oracle is distributed identically as only ˜vk′ will be necessary for Incent, the first part of
the rating is not used. The Collect oracle is distributed identically to Game 1, because with probability
1/2, the challenge users will be swapped in RL†. This is identical to in Game 1.
ρ∗ is distributed identically in Game 1, because (vk∗, td∗, ṽk
∗
) are chosen identically, and A′ is re-
turned with a DAA* signature for either uid0 or uid1.
If A wins with probability greater than 1/2, they output ω1, ω1 so that Ω∗0 , Ω∗1 6=⊥. Therefore, as
A′ also outputs ω1, ω1 then they will not fail because of this. A′ never queries the USK oracle. If A wins
with probability greater than 1/2, they never query (uid∗0, uid
′∗, l∗, ·, ·, ·) or (uid∗1, uid′
∗
, l∗, ·, ·, ·) to the
Rate oracle, and therefore A′ never queries ((uid′∗, l∗), ·, uid∗1, ·, ·, ·) or ((uid′
∗
, l∗), ·, uid∗0, ·, ·, ·) to the GSig
oracle. A′ successfully guesses b, if A has successfully guessed b. Therefore Pr[S1]− 1/2| ≤ εDAA*,anon, and
so our construction satisfies Anonymity of Ratings under a Corrupt Reputation Holder.
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SndToU(uid,Min)
Mout ← SndToUDAA*(uid,Min), if final message simulate π with transcript T return (Mout, π) else return Mout
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| > 1 return ⊥
if |{i ∈ [k] : (·, uidi, fbi, ri, ρi, ·, l) ∈ RL†}| = 1
k ← k + 1, (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk)← (fb∗, uid′
∗
, r∗, (⊥, ˜vk′))
t1, · · · , tk ← Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, ·) /∈ IL IL← IL ∪ (ti, (fbi, uidi, ri, ρi))
choose random permutation Π, return tΠ(1), · · · , tΠ(k)
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω):
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk), Ω←$ GSig((uid′, l), (fb, vk), uid, r, l, ω), ρ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l}, return ρ
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig(choose, paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)← (isk, gpkDAA*),








, r∗, ω0, ω1)←$ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(choose, gpk, rhsk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk∗, td∗)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk∗ ←$Enc(rwpk, vk∗)





′∗, l∗), (fb∗, ˜vk∗), r∗, l∗, ω0, ω1)
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig(guess, stA′ , Ω∗)
ρ∗ ← (Ω∗, ˜vk∗), (vk′, td′)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ˜vk′ ←$Enc(rwpk, vk′), b′′ ←$ {0, 1}
(td′, vk′)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ˜vk′ ←$Enc(rwpk, vk′)
RL† ← {(uid∗b′′ , uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗, td∗, l∗), (uid∗1−b′′ , uid
′∗, fb∗, r∗, (⊥, ˜vk′), td′, l∗)}
return ASndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(guess, stA, ρ∗)
Fig. 12: A′ breaks Anonymity of the DAA* scheme using A
Lemma 3. The construction satisfies Traceability if the DAA* scheme satisfies both Traceability and
Non–Frameability, and the SPK is online extractable and simulation sound.
Proof. Assuming that the DAA* scheme used satisfies the Traceability and Non Frameability require-
ments, and the SPK is online extractable and simulation sound, then the APR construction satisfies
traceability.
First we show that if there exists an adversary A such that Pr[ExptraceA,APR(τ, f1, f2) = 1] = ε, where
ε is non-negligible, then we can can build either an adversary A′1 that breaks the Non–Frameability of
DAA* signatures or an adversary A′2 that breaks the Traceability of DAA* signatures, with non-negligible
probability. We give the detailed descriptions of A′1,A′2 in Figures 13 and 14, and explain here how they
work.
We first describe two potential strategies that A could take, firstly they could output at least one
rating whose DAA signature component identifies under DAA*IdentifyS to the secret key of an honest
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user resulting from a query to AddU. Or all ratings output could not identify to the secret key of an
honest user under DAA*IdentifyS . In the first case we will build an adversary A′1, which we will give in
Figure 13, that breaks the Non–Frameability requirement of DAA* signatures. In the second case we will
build an adversary A′2, which we will give in Figure 14, that breaks the Traceability requirement of DAA*
signatures
We now explain why the simulation A′1 gives to A is identically distributed to in the Traceability ex-
periment with the APR construction, and explain how A′1 breaks Non-Frameability for DAA* signatures,
provided A successfully breaks Traceability following the first strategy.
AddU(uid)
Use SndToUDAA* oracle to simulate role of user
SndToRH(uid,Min))
As in original security game
AllocateRep(uid, r, l)
As in original security game
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk), Ω←$ GSig((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk), uid, r, l, ω), ρ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l}, return ρ
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig1 (paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)← (isk, gpkDAA*),
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid′, l, (fb1, r1, (Ω1, ˜vk1)), · · · (fbk, rk, (Ωk, ˜vkk)←$AAddU,SndToRH,AllocateRep,Rate,TD(gpk, rwsk)
uid∗ ←$HL, i∗ ←$ [k], return ((uid′, l), (fbi∗ , ˜vki∗), uid∗, ri∗ , l, Ωi∗)
Fig. 13: A′1 which breaks the non–frameability of DAA* signatures, using A which breaks the traceability
requirement of the APR construction following the first strategy with probability ε
All inputs that A′1 provides to A are distributed identically in the Traceability experiment. This is
because (paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk) are the outputs of DAA*Setup, DAA*KeyGen and so (param, gpk, rwsk,
rhsk) are distributed identically. The SndToUDAA* oracle can be used to simulate the role of the honest
user for AddU. The SndToRH and AllocateRep oracles are identical to in the original security game. The
Rate oracle is also distributed identically to in the security game, because (vk, ṽk, td) are computed
identically, and GSig will output DAA* signatures as in Rate. The TD oracle is identical.
Therefore if A successful breaks Traceability, and outputs a signature that identifies with an honest
user generated through AddU, then A′1 will be successful with probability 1/k|HL|. This is because A′1
outputs a valid signature that was not obtained through GSig (because otherwise A would have obtained
this through the Rate oracle ), and an honest user that has not been queried to the USK oracle. There is a
1/k chance that A′1 has chosen the signature that identifies to the honest user, and a 1/|HL| probability
that A′1 has chosen the correct honest user.
We now switch to the case of an adversary that breaks the Traceability of an APR construction
by submitting signatures that do not identify to an honest user obtained by AddU. We explain why
the simulation A′2 gives to A is identically distributed to in the Traceability experiment with the APR
construction, and explain how A′2 breaks Traceability for DAA* signatures provided A successfully breaks
Traceability following the second strategy.
All inputs that A′2 provides to A are distributed identically in the Traceability experiment. This is




Use SndToRH oracle to simulate Issue otherwise as in original security game
SndToRH(uid,Min))
if online extractable SPK sent, extract gsk
out←$ SndToIDAA*(uid,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← gsk, return out
AllocateRep(uid, r, l)
return Update(uid, l, r)
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
As in original security requirement
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)
As in original security game
A′SndToIDAA*,Update(paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), rhpk ← gpkDAA*
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid′, l, (fb1, r1, (Ω1, ˜vk1)), · · · (fbk, rk, (Ωk, ˜vkk)←$AAddU,SndToRH,AllocateRep,Rate,TD(gpk, rwsk)
if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t ∀uid ∈ HL ∪ CL s.t decuid = accept DAA*IdentifyS((uid
′, l), (fbi, ṽki), r, l, Ωi,gsk[uid]) = 0
i∗ ← i
return (Ωi∗ , (fbi∗ , ṽki∗), (uid
′, l), ri∗ , l, {gsk[uid] : uid ∈ HL} ∪ {gsk[uid] : uid ∈ CL ∧ decuid = accept})
else return ⊥
Fig. 14: A′2 which breaks the Traceability of DAA* signatures, using A which breaks the traceability
requirement of the APR construction following the second strategy with probability ε
Simulating the AddU Oracle The AddU oracle is identical except instead of performing Issue, instead
SndToRH is used.
Simulating the SndToRH Oracle In the case of SndToRH, gsk[uid] can be extracted from the online-
extractable SPK. As the SndToIDAA* oracle is identical to SndToRH and the join/ issue protocols of
DAA*/ APR are identical, SndToRH is distributed identically in the Traceability requirement.
Simulating the AllocateRep Oracle As DAA*Update and AllocateRep are the same, and the AllocateRep
and Update oracles are the same, AllocateRep is distributed identically in the Traceability requirement.
Simulating the Rate and TD Oracles The Rate and TD oracles are identical to in the Traceability game,
because A′2 can use the secret keys of honest users.
Reduction to breaking Traceability of DAA* signatures Assume A is successful, and follows the second
strategy. Then it outputs k > |CL| valid signatures that are not output by the Rate oracle, do not identify
to any of the secret keys of honest users, and are unlinkable under FormRep1. Then if all signature identify
to a corrupted user in CL (such that the join protocol accepted), then two signatures must identify to the
same user as k > |CL|. This would allow A′2 to break the second game in the Traceability requirement for
DAA* signatures. Therefore, at least one signature must not identify to any corrupted users (such that the
join protocol accepted) under DAA*IdentifyS . Therefore A′2 will be successful, because it outputs secret
keys corresponding to all completed SndToI transcripts, and a valid signature that does not identify to
any of these secret keys (because it also will not identify to any honest users as we assume A follows the
second strategy).
Therefore, if A is successful with probability ε and follows the second strategy, A′ breaks traceability
of DAA* signatures.
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Lemma 4. The construction satisfies Non–Frameability if the LRS and DAA* schemes both satisfy Non–
Frameability, and the SPK is zero-knowledge.
Proof. Assuming the DAA* scheme satisfies the Non–Frameability requirement, the Ring Signature
scheme also satisfies Non–Frameability, and the SPK is zero knowledge, then the APR construction
satisfies Non–Frameability.
First we show that if there exists an adversaryA for the first game of the Non-Frameability requirement
such that Pr[Expnon−frameA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] = ε, where ε is non-negligible, then we can can build an
adversary A′, that breaks the Non–Frameability of DAA* signatures with non-negligible probability. We
give the detailed description of A′ in Figure 15, and explain here how A′ works.
We explain why the simulation A′ gives to A is identically distributed to in the first game of the
Non–Frameability experiment with the APR construction, and explain how A′ breaks Non–Frameability
for DAA* signatures provided A succesfully breaks Non-Frameability.
SndToU(uid,Min)
Mout ← SndToUDAA*(uid,Min), if final message simulate π with transcript T return (Mout, π) else return Mout
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(vk, td)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk), Ω←$ GSig((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk), uid, r, l, ω).ρ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l} return ρ
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
A′SndToUDAA*,USK,GSig(paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)← (isk, gpkDAA*),
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, fb, uid′, l, r, (Ω, ṽk))←$ASndToU,Rate,TD(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
return ((uid′, l), (ṽk, fb), uid, r, l, Ω)
Fig. 15: A′ which breaks the Non-Frameability of DAA* signatures, using A which breaks the Non–
Frameability requirement of the APR construction with probability ε
Simulating the input to A All inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically in the Non–
Frameability experiment. This is because (paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, isk) are the outputs of DAA*Setup,
DAA*KeyGen and so (param, gpk, rwsk, rhsk) are distributed identically. The SndToU oracles in both
the Non–Frameability of DAA* security requirement and the APR Non–Frameability requirement are
identical, and the < Join, Issue > protocol is identical for the DAA* scheme and the APR construction,
except for the SPK that can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property. Therefore the SndToU oracle
is distributed identically. The Rate oracle is also distributed identically, because (vk, ṽk, td) are computed
identically, and GSig will output DAA* signatures. The TD oracle is identical to in the Non–Frameability
requirement because the trapdoor td is computed identically in the Rate oracle.
Reduction to breaking Non–Frameability of DAA* signatures AssumeA is successful, forA′ to be successful
it must satisfy four requirements: the DAA* signature output must be valid, the user output must be in
HL but not corrupted with USK, the signature must not be output by the signing oracle, and the signature
must identify to the secret key of the honest user output. As A is successful and does not have access to a
USK oracle, the first three are clearly satisfied. As A is successful, the signature links to another signature
returned by the signing oracle authored by uid and with the same basename (uid′, l). This signature is
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honestly generated and so will identify to the user uid under DAA*IdentifyS . If the signature output by
A′ does not identify to uid under DAA*IdentifyS , then this would break the second game of the DAA*
Non–Frameability requirement. Otherwise A′ will be successful.
Next, we show that if there exists an adversary A for the second game of the Non-Frameability
requirement such that Pr[Expnon−frameA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] = ε, where ε is non-negligible, then we can can
build an adversary A′, that breaks the Non–Frameability of Linkable Ring signatures with non-negligible
probability. We give the detailed description of A′ in Figure 16, and explain here how A′ works.
We explain why the simulation A′ gives to A is identically distributed to in the second game of the
Non–Frameability experiment with the APR construction, and explain how A′ breaks Non–Frameability
for Linkable Ring signatures provided A succesfully breaks Non-Frameability.
SndToU(uid,Min))
As in original security game
USK(uid))
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
uidRS ←$ {0, 1}∗, vk←$ AddURS(uidRS), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk)
Ω←$DAA*Sign((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk),gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, l), ρ∗ ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ∗, uidRS, l}, return ρ
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
As in original security game
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k]
parse tdi = uidRS σi ←$ SignRS(uidRS, uidi, t1, · · · tk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
A′AddURS,SignRS,Corrupt(τ, f1, f2)
(param, f1, f2)←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param)
(rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, σ, t1, · · · , tk, l)←$ASndToU,USK,Rate,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
return (st, (t1, · · · , tk), uid, σ)
A′AddURS,SignRS,Corrupt(st)
if ∃((fb, uid′, r, ρ), uid, σ̂, t1, · · · tk, l) ∈ CLL s.t FormRep2(uid, σ, σ̂, t1, · · · tk, gpk) =⊥
return (σ̂, uid, t1, · · · , tk)else return ⊥
Fig. 16: A′ which breaks the Non-Frameability of Linkable Ring signatures, using A which breaks the
Non–Frameability requirement of the APR construction with probability ε
All inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically in the Non–Frameability experiment. This
is because the only difference to the Non–Frameabiliity game is during the Rate oracle, ring signature
verification keys are generated using the AddURS oracle, which outputs verification keys identical to those
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generated in LRKeyGen. However, the Collect oracle no longer has access to the trapdoor for these
ratings, therefore the SignRS oracle is used to generate the incentive claim.
Reduction to breaking Non–Frameability of Linkable Ring Signatures If A is successful with probability ε,
A′ breaks Non–Frameability of Linkable Ring Signatures with probability at least ε, provided A′ does not
abort. In the second stage, as A is successful then a signature will be found in CLL, and so A′ will output
a second signature. Clearly both signatures A′ outputs are clearly valid and link, as A is successful. As
A is successful, they will not return an incentive claim that has been obtained from the Collect oracle,
therefore the first signature output was not returned from the SignRS oracle. As the Corrupt oracle is
not used the ring output will not contain any corrupted verification keys. The second ring output only
contains verification keys generated from AddURS, because the Collect oracle only accepts incentives
originating from ratings generated with the Rate oracle. Therefore all the conditions are satisfied and so
A′ is successful.
Lemma 5. The construction satisfies Unforgeability of Reputation if the DAA* scheme satisfies Unforge-
ability of Reputation and Traceability, and the SPK is online extractable and simulation sound.
Proof. Assuming that the DAA* scheme used satisfies the Unforgeability of Reputation requirement, and
the SPK is online extractable and simulation sound, then the APR construction satisfies Unforgeability
of Reputation.
First we show that if there exists an adversary A such that Pr[Expuf−repA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] = ε, where ε
is non-negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′, that breaks the Unforgeability of Repuation of
DAA* signatures with non-negligible probability. We give the detailed description of A′ in Figure 17, and
explain here how A′ works.
We explain why the simulation A′ gives to A is identically distributed to the Unforgeability of Repu-
tation experiment with the APR construction, and explain how A′ breaks Unforgeability of Reputation
for DAA* signatures provided A succesfully breaks Unforgeability of Reputation.
All inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically in the Unforgeability of Reputation
experiment. This is because (paramDAA*, gpkDAA*) are the outputs of DAA*Setup, DAA*KeyGen and so
(param, gpk, rwsk) are distributed identically.
Simulating the AddU Oracle The AddU oracle is identical except instead of performing Issue, SndToIDAA*
is used. Therefore the AddU oracle is distributed identically.
Simulating the SndToRH Oracle We now show that answers to SndToRH queries are correctly distributed.
As the SndToIDAA* oracle is identical to the SndToRH oracle and the issue protocols of DAA*/ APR are
identical, SndToRH is distributed identically in the Unforgeability of Reputation requirement. gsk[uid]
can be extracted whenever the protocol completes due to the online-extractable SPK.
Simulating the AllocateRep Oracle As DAA*Update and AllocateRep are the same, AllocateRep is
distributed identically in the Unforgeability of Reputation requirement.
Simulating the Rate and TD Oracles The Rate and TD oracles are identical to in the Unforgeability of
Reputation game, because A′ can use the secret keys of honest users.
Reduction to breaking Unforgeability of Reputation of DAA* signatures Assume A is successful, we show
that A′ is also successful. If a signature is output by A that does not identify to any honest or corrupt
user (whose join protocol completed), then A′ can break Traceability defined in the first game. Therefore,
if the number of different users that the signatures output by A identify to under DAA*IdentifyS is strictly
less than k, then there must be at least two signatures which identify to the same user. This would break
Traceability of DAA* signatures, defined in the second game. Therefore there must be at least k users
that signatures identify to. As A is successful, there has been less than k queries to the Update oracle for
(l, r) for different users. Therefore at least one user musn’t have been queried to the Update oracle for
(l, r). So A′ will definitely find a user and signature to output.
In order for A′ to be succesful the signature, user and list of secret keys must satisfy the following four
conditions. The signature must be valid, which is clearly true as A was successful. For every completed
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AddU(uid)
Use SndToIDAA* oracle to simulate Issue, otherwise as in original security game
SndToRH(uid,Min))
if online extractable SPK sent, extract gsk
out←$ SndToIDAA*(uid,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← gsk, return out
AllocateRep(uid, r, l)
return Update(uid, l, r)
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
As in original security game
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
A′SndToIDAA*,Update(paramDAA*, gpkDAA*, f1, f2)
paramEnc ←$EncSetup(1
τ ), param← (paramDAA*, paramEnc, f1, f2), rhpk ← gpkDAA*
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(r, uid′, l, (fb1, (Ω1, ṽk1)), · · · , (fbk, Ωk, ṽkk))←$AAddU,SndToRH,Rate,TD,AllocateRep(gpk, rwsk)
∀i ∈ [k] if ∃uid ∈ HL ∪ CL s.t decuid = accept and DAA*IdentifyS((uid
′, l), (fbi, ṽki), r, l, Ωi,gsk[uid]) = 1
uidi ← uid
if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t (uidi, l, r) /∈ UL
return ((uid′, l), (fbi, ṽki), r, l, Ωi, uidi, {gsk[uid] : uid ∈ HL} ∪ {gsk[uid] : uid ∈ CL ∧ decuid = accept})
else return ⊥
Fig. 17: A′ which breaks the Unforgeability of Reputation of DAA* signatures, using A which breaks the
Unforgeability of Reputation requirement of the APR construction with probability ε
SndToI transcript, a secret key must be output that identifies to this transcript under DAA*IdentifyT ,
which is clearly true as all honest and corrupted user secret keys have been output by A′. The signature
output must identify to the secret key that identifies with the user’s transcript, which is clearly true,
as the signature identifies to the user’s secret key. Finally the Update oracle should also have not been
queried for (uid, l, r), which was the condition for the user to have been returned.
Therefore, if A is successful with probability ε, A′ breaks Unforgeability of Reputation of DAA*
signatures with probability at least ε.
Lemma 6. The construction satisfies Fair Rewards if the LRS scheme satisfies Linkability and Non–
Frameability.
Proof. Assuming that the Linkable Ring Signature scheme used satisfies the Linkability and Non–Frameability
requirements, then the APR construction satisfies Fair Rewards.
First we show that if there exists an adversary A such that Pr[Expfair−rewA,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] = ε making
n1 queries to the Rate, where ε is non-negligible, then we can can build either an adversary A′1, that
breaks the Non–Frameability of Linkable Ring Signatures signatures or an adversary A′2 that breaks the
Linkability of Linkable Ring signatures, with non-negligible probability. We give the detailed description
of A′1,A′2 in Figures 18 and 19, and explain here how A′1,A′2 work.
We first describe two potential strategies that A could take.
Let VK be the incentives output by A which correspond to ratings obtained from the Rate that have
not been trapdoored, if for some rating (uid∗, uid′
∗
, fb∗, r∗, ρ∗, td∗, l) ∈ SL corresponding to incentive
t ∈ VK, we have that σ = CollectIncent(0, (fb∗, uid′∗, l, r∗, ρ∗, td∗), t, gpk) links to σ∗ also output by the
adversary, we say that A adopts the first strategy. Otherwise we say A adopts the second strategy. In the
first case we will build an adversary A′1, which we will give in Figure 18, that breaks the Non–Frameability
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requirement of Linkable Ring signatures. In the second case we will build an adversary A′2, which we will
give in Figure 19, that breaks the Linkability requirement of Linkable Ring Signatures.
We now explain why the simulation A′1 gives to A is identically distributed to in the Fair Rewards
experiment with the APR construction, and explain how A′1 breaks Non-Frameability for Linkable Ring
Signatures signatures provided A succesfully breaks Fair Rewards following the first strategy.
SndToU(uid,Min))
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
if uid /∈ HL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
R← R+ 1 if R 6= R∗ as in original security game
else uidRS ←$ {0, 1}∗, vk←$ AddURS(uidRS), ṽk←$Enc(rwpk, vk)
Ω←$DAA*Sign((uid′, l), (fb, ṽk),gsk[uid], ω, gpk, r, l), ρ∗ ← (Ω, ṽk)
SL← SL ∪ {uid, uid′, fb, r, ρ∗, ∗, l}, return ρ∗
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
if (·, uid′, fb, r, ρ, td, l) ∈ SL
if td = ∗ A′1 aborts
TDL← TDL ∪ {((fb, uid′, l, r, ρ)} return td
else return ⊥
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
As in original security game
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
∀i ∈ [k] if (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k]
if tdi = ∗ σi ←$ SignRS(uidRS, uidi, t1, · · · tk)
else σi ←$CollectIncent(uidi, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · tk, gpk)
CLL← CLL ∪ {((fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi), uidi, σi, t1, · · · tk, l)}
choose random permutation Π for j = 1, · · · , k return {uidΠ(j), σΠ(j) : j ∈ [1, k]}
A′AddURS,SignRS,Corrupt1 (τ, f1, f2)
R← 0, R∗ ←$ [n1], (param, f1, f2)←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param)
(rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, (σ1, · · ·σk2), (t1, · · · tk1), l)←$A
SndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
if ∃i ∈ [k1] s.t (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return 0
if ∃i ∈ [1, k1] such that Verify(fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, gpk) = 0 return 0
if ∃i ∈ [k1] s.t ρi = ρ∗ i∗ ← i else return 0
σ∗ ←$ SignRS(uidRS, 0, {ti∗})
if ∃j ∈ [k2] s.t LRLink(σ∗, σj , 0, uid) return (st, σj , uid, t1, · · · , tk1)
A′AddURS,SignRS,Corrupt1 (st)
return (σ∗, 0, {ti∗})
Fig. 18: A′1 which breaks the Non-Frameability of Linkable Ring signatures, using A which breaks the
Fair Rewards requirement of the APR construction following the first strategy with probability ε
All inputs that A′1 provides to A are distributed identically in the Fair Rewards experiment. This is
because the only difference to in the Fair Rewards game is during the Rate oracle when one ring signature
verification key is generated using the AddURS oracle. This is identically distributed to generating this
with LRKeyGen. However, the Collect oracle no longer has access to the trapdoor, therefore the SignRS
oracle is used to generate the incentive claims. If this rating is queried to the trapdoor oracle, A′1 aborts.
31
IfA successfully breaks Fair Rewards and follows the first strategy, thenA′1 will be successful, provided
they do not abort early. This is because both signatures A′1 outputs are clearly valid and link, as A is
successful. As A is successful, they will not return an incentive claim that originated from the Collect
oracle, therefore the first signature output was not returned from the SignRS oracle. As the Corrupt
oracle is not used, the first ring output will not contain any corrupted verification keys. The second ring
output only contains a verification key generated from AddURS.
A′i aborts early in three cases. Firstly, the rating ρ∗ is input to the trapdoor oracle. Say the number
of ratings submitted to the trapdoor oracle is n2, then the probability of this not occurring and so A′1
not aborting here is (n1 − n2)/n1. Secondly, the incentive associated to ρ∗ is not output by A, say A
outputs n3 incentives associated to ratings from the Rate oracle that have not been trapdoored. Then
the probability of this not occurring and so A′1 not aborting here is n3/(n1 − n2). Finally, no incentive
claim is found that links to σ∗. We know that for all the incentives output by A that are associated to
ratings from the Rate that were not trapdoored, at least one will produce a signature that will link to
some σj . Therefore, the probability that A′1 does not abort here is at least 1/n3. We note that as the
first strategy is followed: n1, n1 − n2, n3 6= 0.
Putting this all together the probability A′1 does not abort is 1/n1. Therefore, if A is successful with
probability ε and follows the first strategy, A′1 breaks the Non–Frameability of Linkable Ring signatures
with probability at least ε/n1.
We now address the case of an adversary that breaks the Fair Rewards of an APR construction by
following the second strategy given above. We explain why the simulation A′2 gives to A is identically
distributed to in the Fair Rewards experiment with the APR construction, and explain how A′2 breaks
Linkability for Ring Signatures provided A succesfully breaks Fair Rewards following the second strategy
above.
SndToU(uid,Min))
As in original security game
Rate(uid, uid′, l, fb, r, ω)
As in original security game
TD(fb, uid′, l, r, ρ):
As in original security game
Incent((fb1, uid1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uidk, rk, ρk), l):
As in original security game
Collect((t1, · · · , tk), l):
As in original security game
A′2(τ, f1, f2)
(param, f1, f2)←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param)
(rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, (σ1, · · ·σk2), (t1, · · · tk1), l)←$A
SndToU,Rate,TD,Incent,Collect(gpk, rwsk, rhsk)
if ∃i ∈ [k1] s.t (ti, (fbi, uid′i, ri, ρi)) /∈ IL return 0
if ∃i ∈ [k1] such that Verify(fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, gpk) = 0 return 0
L← ∅ ∀i ∈ [k1] if (uidi, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, li) ∈ SL and (fbi, uid′i, li, ri, ρi) /∈ TDL L← L ∪ {i}
∀i ∈ L σ′i ←$ LRSign(tdi, 0, (ti))
return {ti : i ∈ k1}, {((t1, · · · tk1), uid, σi) : i ∈ k2} ∪ {((ti), 0, σ
′
i) : i ∈ L}
Fig. 19: A′2 which breaks the Linkability of Linkable Ring Signatures, using A which breaks the Fair
Rewards requirement of the APR construction following the second strategy with probability ε
All inputs that A′2 provides to A are distributed identically in the Fair Rewards experiment, because
they are computed identically.
Reduction to breaking Linkability of Linkable Ring Signatures Assume A is successful, and follows the
second strategy. Then A′2 will be successful. This is because clearly all ring signatures output are valid, as
A is successful. All rings output are also clearly a subset of the verification keys output. As A is successful,
the ring signatures in set {((t1, · · · tk1), uid, σi) : i ∈ k2} are clearly unlinkable to each other. In the second
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set all linkable ring signatures are signed using different secret keys, as they are all from different Rate
queries, therefore they are unlinkable to each other. As A follows the second strategy clearly no signature
from the first set links to the second set. Therefore all the signatures output are unlinkable. As A is
successful, more incentive claims are output by A than the ratings they output that are not obtained
from the Rate oracle or were trapdoored. Therefore k2 > k1 − |L| , and so k2 + |L| > k1. Therefore more
signatures are output by A′2 than verification keys, and so A′ is succesful.
Therefore, if A is successful with probability ε and follows the second strategy, A′2 breaks the Linka-
bility of Linkable Ring signatures with probability at least ε.
5 Concrete Instantiation and Efficiency
Concrete Instantiation The CDL* construction, which we give in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, satisfies the security
requirements for a DAA* scheme given in Section 3.4. We give formal proofs for this in Appendix C.
The CDL* construction is a modification of the DAA scheme from [15], which we will refer to as
the CDL construction. This scheme is indistinguishable from the ideal functionality given in [15], and
therefore satisfies the state of the art security definition for Direct Anonymous Attestation. We have
modified this scheme so that the user is not split between a Trusted Platform Module and a host, as this
is not necessary in this context. We have further modified the scheme, in CDL*, in an analogous way
to [32]. This modification binds the reputation value to the signatures visibly, using an updated secret
key received during CDL*Update. Therefore, when signing, users are forced to reveal their reputation.
The algorithm CDL*Update provides the user with the tokens they need to prove they have a particular
reputation. CDL*Sign must now check the update tokens input are correct, and otherwise output ⊥. In
CDL, β is a secret key of the issuer, Y = Gβ2 is a public key of the issuer. This modification in CDL*
involves switching to β+ γH2(r, t) instead of β in both CDL*Sign and CDL*Verify, where CDL*Verify can
be performed by switching to Y ZH2(r,t) = G
β+γH2(r,t)
2 instead of Y = G
β
2 . The user is given a token in
CDL*Update that allows them to obtain a user private key for Y ZH2(r,t) instead of Y .
The < DAA*Join,DAA*Issue > protocol in CDL* already contains a suitable SPK of the user secret
key. A linkable ring signature scheme that securely realises the model in Section 3.3 is given in [4].
Efficiency An incentive claim would have size log(l)poly(τ), where l is the number of incentives. This
is the current state of the art for linkable ring signatures, and is reasonable, albeit large. Ratings are
reasonably small, and consist of 7 τ -bit elements, and an encryption of 3 commitments.
5.1 CDL* Construction
Preliminaries Details on the proof protocols used in the CDL* construction are given in Section 3.2.
Bilinear Maps and the LRSW assumption Let G1, G2, GT be cyclic groups of prime order p.
A map e : G1 × G2 → GT must satisfy the following conditions: bilinearity, i.e., e(gx1 , g
y
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
xy;
non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, e(g1, g2) generates GT ; and efficiency, i.e.,
there exists an efficient algorithm G(1τ ) that outputs a bilinear group (p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2), and an
efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for all a ∈ G1, b ∈ G2.
We use type-3 pairings [29] in this work, i.e., we do not assume G1 = G2 or the existence of an
isomorphism between both groups in our scheme and security proofs. The advantage of type-3 pairings
is that they enjoy the most efficient curves.
Definition 3 (LRSW Assumption). In (G1,G2) an adversary is given generators G1, G2 of G1, G2
respectively, X = Gα2 , Y = G
β
2 for some α, β ∈ Z∗p and access to an oracle that when f is input, outputs
(A,Aβ , Aα, AαAfαβ) where A = Gr2 for uniform r ∈ Z∗p. It is hard for the adversary to output (f,A,B,C)
such that A ∈ G1, B = Aβ , C = AαAfαβ , and f has not been queried to the oracle.
CDL* Construction We give the CDL*Setup, CDL*KeyGen, CDL*Update, CDL*Sign, CDL*Verify,
CDL*Link, CDL*IdentifyT , CDL*IdentifyS algorithms in Figure 20, and the < CDL*Join,CDL*Issue >
protocol in Figure 21.
We prove that the CDL* construction securely realizes a DAA* scheme in Appendix C, assuming the
LRSW assumption [43], the DDH assumption and the random oracle model.
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CDL*Setup(1k)
(p,G1,G2,G3, τ̂ , G1, G2)←$G(1k), select hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
return param← (G1,G2,G3, p, τ̂ , G1, G2,H1,H2)
CDL*KeyGen*(param)
α, β, γ ←$Z∗p, X ← G2α ∈ G2, Y = G2β ∈ G2, Z ← G2γ
return gpk = (X,Y, Z), isk = (α, β, γ)
CDL*Update(r, t, (α, β, γ), uid, reg, gpk)
if reg[uid] =⊥ return ⊥ else let reg[uid] = (F, (A,B,C,D))





πU ←$SPK{a : ω1 = Aa}
return (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU )
CDL*Sign(bsn,m, (f, (A,B,C,D), (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU ), gpk, r, t)
if τ̂(ω2, G2) 6= τ̂(ω1, Y ZH2(r,t)) or τ̂(ω3, G2) 6= τ̂(ω1ωf3 , X) or πU does not verify return ⊥
a←$Z∗p, A′ ← ωa1 , B′ ← ωa2 , C′ ← ωa3 , D′ ← ωaf2
if bsn 6=⊥ J ← H1(bsn)f , π←$SPK{f : D′ = B′f ∧ J = H1(bsn)f}
if bsn =⊥ J ←⊥, π←$SPK{f : D′ = B′f}
return Ω = (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
CDL*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gpk)
Let Ω = (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, c, s), Ỹ ← Y ZH2(r,t)
Verify π with respect to A′, B′, C′, D′, J
if A′ = 1 or J = 1 return 0
if τ̂(A′, Ỹ ) 6= τ̂(B′, G2) or τ̂(A′D′, X) 6= τ̂(C′, G2) return 0 else return 1
CDL*Link((bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0), (bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1), gpk)
For b ∈ {0, 1}, let Ωb = (A′b, B′b, C′b, D′b, Jb, cb, sb)
if bsn0 6= bsn1 or bsn0, bsn1 =⊥ return 0
if ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that CDL*Verify(bsnb,mb, rb, tb, Ωb, gpk) = 0 return 0
if J0 = J1 return 1 else return 0
CDL*IdentifyT (T , (f,A,B,C,D))
Let T = (n, (F, πf ), (cre, πcre)), if F = Gf1 and cre = (A,B,C,D) return 1 else return 0
CDL*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, (f,A,B,C,D))
Let Ω = (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, c, s), if CDL*Verify(bsn,m, r, t, Ω) = 0 return 0
if D′ = B′f return 1 else return 0
Fig. 20: The algorithms of CDL*:
5.2 Concrete Instantiation of CDL*
The non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in CDL* are as follows: πF and πcre used in
the join protocol, π used in CDL*Sign, and πU used in CDL*Update. For πF , πU and πcre we need the
witnesses to be online extractable. For this, we additionally encrypt the witness under a public key that
needs to be added to param (and to which in security proof we will know the secret key for), and extend
the proof to prove that the additional encryption contains the same witness that is used in the rest of
the proof. For the verifiable encryption of the witness we use Paillier encryption [19], that is secure under
the DCR assumption [47].
For transforming interactive into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs we rely on the Fiat-Shamir




choose n←$ {0, 1}k
 n
f ←$Z∗p, F ← Gf1 ,
πF ←$SPK{(f) : F = Gf1}(n)
-F, πF
Verify πF , F ∈ G1 and F 6= 1
s←$Z∗p, A← G1s, B ← Aβ
C ← AαF sαβ , D ← F sβ
cre← (A,B,C,D), πcre ←$
SPK{t : B = Gt1 ∧D = F t}
reg[uid]← (F, cre)
cre, πcre
if A = 1 return ⊥
Verify πcre
if τ̂(A, Y ) 6= τ̂(B,G2) or τ̂(AD,X) 6= τ̂(C,G2)
return ⊥
gsk[uid]← (f, cre)
Fig. 21: The < CDL*Join,CDL*Issue > Protocol
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We give a security model for an anonymous peer rating system APR that allows accurate ratings to
be incentivised, feedback to be weighted by reputation, and multiple feedback on the same subject to
be detected, whilst still ensuring ratings remain anonymous. We use Linkable Ring Signatures and a
modification of DAA to build a construction that is secure under these requirements. The DAA and
Linkable Ring Signature primitives are not inherent in realising our APR system. Different primitives
could be used to build constructions that are more efficient or rely on different assumptions.
In a peer rating system, a high reputation score leads to a real payoff for users, corresponding to
an increase in utility. When increasing one’s utility is the ultimate goal, game theory helps to gain
new insights. A peer rating system formalised through game theory, which also follows the strategies of
weighting feedback and incentivising accurate ratings, is proposed in [56] and experimentally simulated
when used in collaborative intrusion detection systems in [24]. It is shown in [56] to what extent it pays off
for users to rate accurately given the size of incentives and the size of the coalition(s) of dishonest users.
However, anonymity of ratings is not taken into account and a fully trusted central authority receives the
ratings and issues the incentives. As future work, we want to determine game theoretically whether our
scheme incentivises accurate ratings.
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A Correctness of APR
We now give the full definition of correctness of an APR system. We give the full games in Figure 22.
The first game ensures that given a user is honestly joined to the system, and AllocateRep and Rate are
performed correctly, with the user private key resulting from the user’s join protocol, then the rating
output will be valid. It also ensures that provided FormRep1 is input valid ratings all on the same subject
but originating from different users, it will correctly output the average of these feedbacks weighted by
reputation.
The second game ensures that if Incent is performed correctly on a set of honestly generated ratings,
and CollectIncent is performed on one of these ratings, along with the trapdoor, and the incentives output
by Incent, it will output a valid incentive claim. If FormRep2 is input k valid incentive claims that all
originate from different incentives it will output f1(k).
An APR system satisfies Correctness if for all functions f1, f2, for all polynomial time adversaries A,
the advantages Pr[Expcorr−1A,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] and Pr[Exp
corr−2
A,APR (τ, f1, f2) = 1] are negligible in τ .
Experiment: Expcorr-1A,APR(τ, f1, f2)
param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
((uid1, fb1, r1), · · · (uidk, fbk, rk), uid′, l)←$AAddU(gpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] such that uidi /∈ HL or gsk[uidi] =⊥ or ∃(i, j) ∈ [1, k]2 such that i 6= j and uidi = uidj return 0
∀i ∈ [1, k] ωi ← AllocateRep(uidi, ri, l, rhsk, reg), (ρi, ·)←$Rate(gsk[uidi], gpk, fbi, uid′, l, ri, ωi)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] such that Verify(fbi, uid′, l, ri, ρi, gpk) = 0 return 1




return 1 else return 0
Experiment: Expcorr-2A,APR(τ, f1, f2)
param←$Setup(1τ , f1, f2), (rhsk, rhpk)←$RHKeyGen(param)
(rwsk, rwpk)←$RWKeyGen(param), gpk ← (param, rwpk, rhpk)
(uid, (uid′1, fb1, r1, ρ1, td1), · · · (uid′k, fbk, rk, ρk, tdk), l)←$AAddU,Rate,TD(gpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t (·, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) /∈ SL return 0
if (uid, uid′i, fbi, ri, ρi, tdi, l) ∈ SL L← L ∪ {i}
t1, · · · , tk ← Incent((fb1, uid′1, r1, ρ1), · · · , (fbk, uid′k, rk, ρk), l, rwsk, gpk)
∀i ∈ L σi ←$CollectIncent(uid, (fbi, uid′i, l, ri, ρi, tdi), t1, · · · , tk, gpk)
if ∃i ∈ L such that VerifyIncent(uid, σi, t1, · · · tk, gpk) = 0 return 1
if FormRep2(uid, {σi : i ∈ L}, t1, · · · , tk, gpk) 6= f1(|L|) return 1 else return 0
Fig. 22: Experiments capturing our Correctness requirement for our APR system
B Security Requirements of Linkable Ring Signatures
We now give the security requirements for Linkable Ring Signatures given in [4] which are Correctness,
Linkability, Linkable Anonymity, Non–Frameability and Unforgeability. We give the first three explicitly
as we make use of these to prove our APR constuction is secure.
Correctness We say that a linkable ring signature scheme LRS = (LRKeyGen, LRSign, LRVerify,
LRLink) is correct if it holds for all τ ∈ Z∗p, all q = poly(τ), all i∗ ∈ [q], all messages m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗
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Experiment: ExplinkA,LRS(τ)
(VK = {vki : i ∈ [k]}, (Σ1,m1, R1), · · · (Σk+1,mk+1, Rk+1))←$A(τ)
return 1 if the following conditions hold else return 0
∀i ∈ [k + 1] Ri ⊆ VK and ∀i ∈ [k + 1] LRVerify(Ri,mi, Σi) = 1 and ∀i, j ∈ [k + 1] s.t i 6= j LRLink(Σi, Σj ,mi,mj) = 0
Fig. 23: Experiment capturing the Linkability security requirement for Linkable Ring Signatures
AddU(uid)
(vkuid, skuid)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ),HL← HL ∪ {uid}
return vkuid
Chal(uid,m,R)
if uid /∈ {uid∗0, uid∗1} or {vkuid∗0 , vkuid∗1} 6⊆ R return ⊥










b←$ {0, 1}, (st, uid∗0, uid∗1)←$AAddU(τ), if uid∗0 or uid∗1 /∈ HL return d←$ {0, 1}
b∗ ←$AChal(st) if b = b∗ return 1 else return 0
Fig. 24: Experiment capturing the Linkable Anonymity security requirement for Linkable Ring Signatures
that, if for all i ∈ [q], (vki, ski)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ), for all R,R′ ⊆ {vk1, ..., vkq}, Σ←$ LRSign(ski∗ ,m,R),
Σ′←$ LRSign(ski∗ ,m′, R′), then Pr[LRVerify(R,m,Σ) = 1] = 1− negl(τ) and Pr[LRLink(Σ,Σ′,m,m′) =
1] = 1− negl(τ), where the probability is taken over the random coins used by LRKeyGen and LRSign.
Linkability This requirement ensures that signatures from the same secret key can be linked. In the
game, the adversary must output k verification keys, and k+ 1 valid signatures, each on a message and a
ring. They win if all rings are subsets of the set of verification keys, and none of the signatures are linked.
We give the full game in Figure 23.
Definition 4 (Linkability). We say that a linkable ring signature scheme LRS satisfies linkability, if for
every polynomial time adversary A, Pr[ExplinkA,LRS(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Linkable Anonymity Linkable Ring Signatures are publicly linkable, however a signature still should
not be able to be traced to the signer’s verification key. The security requirement given below is a
simplication of the one given in [4]. The requirement given here is clearly weaker than in [4], therefore
the construction from [4] will satisfy this requirement. In the game, the adversary is given access to an
AddU oracle to create honest users and receive their verification keys. They return two honest users. They
are then given access to an oracle, where they can submit a challenged user, a message and a ring that
must contain the verification keys of both challenged users. If b = 0, they are returned with a signature
signed with the secret key of the user they input. If b = 1 they are returned with a signature signed by
the other challenged user. They must guess b correctly to win. We give the full game in Figure 24.
Definition 5 (Linkable Anonymity). We say that a linkable ring signature scheme LRS satisfies linkable
anonymity, if for every polynomial time adversary A, |Pr[ExpanonA,LRS(τ) = 1]− 1/2| is negligible in τ .
Non–Frameability This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot frame an honest user by
forging a signature which links to this user’s signature. In the game we give the adversary the AddU, Sign
and Corrupt oracles, to create honest users, obtain their signatures and corrupt them. The adversary
must output a valid signature that was not output by the Sign oracle, on a ring that does not include
any corrupted users. They then must output another valid signature that links to the first, on a ring that
is a subset of users created by the AddU oracle. We give the full game in Figure 25.
Our game differs from that in [4] due to what we believe to be a typo. In their game the ring of the
first instead of the second signature output should be a subset of all users created by the AddU oracle.
The non–frameability proof in [4] is based on the corrected security requirement given here, therefore the
construction given satisfies this requirement. The uncorrected version does not capture an attack where




ruid ←$R, (vkuid, skuid)←$ LRKeyGen(1τ ; ruid),HL← HL ∪ {uid}
Sign(uid,m,R)
if uid /∈ HL or vkuid /∈ R return ⊥
else SL← SL ∪ {uid,m,R,Σ∗}return LRSign(skuid,m,R)
Corrupt(uid)
if uid /∈ HL return ⊥
else C ← C ∪ {vkuid} return ruid
Experiment: Expnon−frameA,LRS (τ)
HL, SL← ∅, (st, Σ∗,m∗, R∗)←$AAddU,Sign,Corrupt(τ)
if LRVerify(R∗,m∗, Σ∗) = 0 or (·,m∗, R∗, Σ∗) ∈ SL or C ∩R∗ 6= ∅ return 0
(Σ′,m′, R′)←$AAddU,Sign,Corrupt(st)
if LRVerify(R′,m′, Σ′) = 1 and LRLink(Σ′, Σ∗,m′,m∗) and R′ ⊆ {vkuid : uid ∈ HL} return 1 else return 0
Fig. 25: Experiment capturing the Non–Frameability security requirement for Linkable Ring Signatures
Definition 6 (Non–Frameability). We say that a linkable ring signature scheme LRS satisfies Non–
Frameability, if for every polynomial time adversary A,
Pr[Expnon−frameA,LRS (τ) = 1]. is negligible in τ .
C Proof of Security of DAA* Construction
We now give proofs of security that the CDL* scheme satisfies the security requirements for a DAA*
scheme, assuming the DDH problem is hard in G1, the Discrete Logarithm problem is hard in G1 and
G2, the bilinear LRSW assumption [43] is hard in (G1,G2), the SPK are zero knowledge, simulation sound
and online extractable (for the underlined values) and the random oracle model.
The proofs of Anonymity, Traceability and Non–Frameability are similar to the simulation based
proof of security of CDL [15]. We have adapted it to the game based security requirements given in
Section 3.4. As the security requirements in [15] were designed to capture the all pre-existing daa security
requirements it is clear that the CDL scheme satisfies the requirements given in [7]. We show that the
modification to bind reputation to the scheme does not affect the security of the scheme. We also show
that CDL* satisfies the new Unforgeability of Reputation requirement.
C.1 Correctness
The CDL* scheme is correct because the original CDL scheme is correct and the modification simply
replaces Y with Y ZH2(r,t), and β with β+γH2(r, t) in both CDL*Sign and CDL*Verify. As Gβ+γH2(r,t)2 =
Y ZH2(r,t), signatures generated correctly with correctly generated secret keys will verify correctly. Linking
follows from the original correctness of the CDL scheme. For a signatures generated honestly with secret
key f , then D′ = B′F , so CDL*IdentifyS will correctly identify the signature. CDL*IdentifyT will output
1, because the secret key input was the same output by the protocol corresponding to T .
C.2 Anonymity
Theorem 2. [Anonymity]Assuming the random oracle model, the DDH assumption in G1, and the SPK
is zero knowledge, simulation sound and online extractable (when underlined), CDL* satisfies Anonymity.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists, such that Pr[ExpanonA′,Π(k) = 1]− 1/2 = ε, with q different
bsn queries to the H1 and GSig oracles, in the choose stage, and n queries to SndToU, in the choose phase,
and ε is non negligible in k, then we can can build an adversary A, that breaks the DDH assumption,
with non-negligible probability. We give A in Figure 26. Below we describe why the simulation given
in Figure 26 is indistinguishable to the Anonymity experiment to A′ if a DDH tuple is input. We then




if uid /∈ HL
HL← HL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1,gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,Stuidjn ← (gpk)
if l = k∗ uid∗ ← uid, F ← Q,2 simulate πF with F, n,St
uid
jn ← (⊥, F, πF )
return ((F, πF ), cont)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in Anonymity experiment
USK(uid):
if uid = uid∗ A return b′′
else perform original USK oracle
GSig(bsn,m, uid, r, t, (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU ):
if uid = uid∗
if πU not valid , return ⊥ else extract ã from πU
extract t from πcre saved for user uid
∗, a′ ← ãtβ−1
if ω2 6= G1a





a←$Z∗p, A′ ← ωa1 , B′ ← ωa2 , C′ ← ωa3 , D′ ← Q
aa′(γH2(r,t)+β)
2
if bsn =⊥ J ←⊥, simulate π return (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
else h← H1(bsn) let (bsn, h, d, d′) ∈ H1
if d′ = 1 A return b′′ else J ← Qd2, simulate π, return (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
else perform original GSig oracle
H1(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·) ∈ H1 return out
j = j + 1, if j = q∗ and b′ = 0, d←$Z∗p, H1 ← (in, Q3d, d, 1) ∪H1, return Q3d
else d←$Z∗p, H1 ← (in, G1d, d, 0) ∪H1 return Q1d
A(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4)
b, b′, b′′ ←$ {0, 1}, k∗ ←$ [1, n], q∗ ←$ [1, q], l, j ← 0, create empty lists H1, set G1 ← Q1
Generate (param, gpk, isk) as in CDL*Setup,CDL*KeyGen
(St, uid0, uid1, bsn,m, r, t, (ω0,1, ω0,2, ω0,3, π0,U ), (ω1,1, ω1,2, ω1,3, π1,U ))←$A′SndToU,USK,GSig,H1(choose, param, gpk, isk)
if uid∗ 6= uidb, return 0, let gsk[uidb−1] = (f, (...))
if b′ = 0, if (bsn, ·, ·, 1) /∈ H1 return 0, else let (bsn, h, d, 1) ∈ H1
if b′ = 1, if ∃(bsn, ·, ·, ·) ∈ H1 return 0 else d←$Z∗p, h← Qd3, H1 ← (bsn, h, d, 1) ∪H1
Check (ω0,1, ω0,2, ω0,3, π0,U ), (ω1,1, ω1,2, ω1,3, π1,U ) valid as in GSig otherwise return b
′′




J ← Qd4, simulate π
b∗ ←$A′SndToU,USK,GSig,H1,H2(guess, St, (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π))
if b∗ = b return 1, else return 0
Fig. 26: A which distinguishes between DDH tuples in G1, using A′ which breaks Anonymity of CDL*
Signatures
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Simulating the inputs to A′ Assuming A is input a DDH tuple, inputs to A′ are distributed identically to
in the Anonymity experiment. If A does not abort, the USK oracle is exactly the same as in the Anonymity
experiment. The SndToU oracle is distributed identically for uid∗ because F is chosen randomly, and πF
can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property. Otherwise SndToU is identical to in the experiment.
Note that f is set as ⊥, but this is not output to A′, or used in the next stage of the protocol. The GSig
oracle is also the same as in the experiment, provided uid∗ is not input. If uid∗ is input, the oracle first
checks that (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU ) are distributed correctly as in CDL*Sign, by extracting exponent of ω1 with
respect to A from the proof πU , and extracting the exponent of A with respect to G1 using the proof
πcre. A









′f1 . Because A has not aborted in GSig then d′ = 0, and
so H1(bsn) = Qd1, and J = Qd2 = H1(bsn)f1 . Due to the zero knowledge property, π can be simulated.
Therefore the output of GSig is distributed identically to in the Anonymity experiment. The H1 oracle
is distributed identically to the random oracle model.
The (gpk, isk) input in the choosing phase are chosen exactly as in CDL*KeyGen.
(A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, π) input in the guessing phase, is distributed identically to in the experiment, because
letting Q4 = Q
f2
3 then A
′ = Qa3 , B
′ = A′γH2(r,t)+β , C ′ = A′αQ
aα(γH2(r,t)+β)
4 = A




′f2 . Because H1(bsn) = Qd3, J = Qd4 = H1(bsn)f2 . Again, due to the zero knowledge
property π can be simulated. This signature is consistent with the USK, GSig and SndToU oracles, because
A does not abort, so uidb = uid∗, and (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) is a DDH tuple, therefore f1 = f2.
Reduction to the DDH problem If A was input a DDH tuple (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4), then we assume uid∗ was
chosen so that uid∗ = uidb, which occurs with probability 1/n, therefore A does not abort.
If A′ outputs bsn in the choosing phase that they have queried to H1 or GSig, we assume b′ = 0,
and that this was the q∗th such query, which occurs with probability 1/2q. Then, all inputs to A′ are
distributed identically to in the Anonymity experiment, and A outputs 1, with the same probability as
in this experiment, ε+ 1/2. Therefore assuming A′ was successful, A outputs 1 with probability at least
1/2qn.
If A′ outputs bsn in the choosing phase that they have not queried to H1 or GSig, we assume b′ = 1
is chosen, which occurs with probability 1/2. Then, all inputs to A′ are distributed identically to in
the Anonymity experiment, and A outputs 1, with the same probability as in this experiment, ε + 1/2.
Therefore assuming A′ was successful, A outputs 1 with probability at least 1/2n.
If (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) is not a DDH tuple, then A still aborts returning 0, with the same probability
as above. A′ is now given a signature in the guess stage, that is independent of both fuid0 and fuid1 ,
therefore the probability A′ guesses correctly is 1/2. If A′ queries USK with uid∗ or GSig with uid = uid∗
and bsn, then A outputs 1 with probability 1/2. Therefore If A′ outputs a bsn in the choosing phase that
they have queried to H1 or GSig, then the probability A outputs 1 is 1/4qn. If A′ outputs a bsn in the
choosing phase that they have not queried to H1 or GSig, then the probability A outputs 1 is 1/4n.
Therefore, A has at least a ε/2qn advantage at distinguishing between DDH tuples.
C.3 Traceability
We will use the security of the following signatures in our Traceability proof. Camenisch–Lysyanskaya
(CL) signatures [18] are existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack [34], under the LRSW
assumption [43]. They consist of algorithms: Key Generation, Sign and Verify given below:




– Sign: On input (m, sk), wherem is the message being signed, chooseA←$G1, output (A,Aβ , Aα+mαβ).
– Verify: On input (pk,m, (A,B,C)), where (A,B,C) is a signature on the message m, output 1 if
t̂(A, Y ) = t̂(B,G2), t̂(AB
m, X) = t̂(C,G2) and A 6= 1G1 , otherwise output 0.
Theorem 3. [Traceability]Assuming that CL signatures are existentially unforgeable under the cho-
sen message attack , and the SPK is zero knowledge, simulation sound, and online extractable (for the
underlined values), CDL* satisfies Traceability.
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Proof. First Traceability Game
We show that if an adversary A′ exists for the first Traceability game, such that ExptraceA′,Π(k) = ε,
which makes polynomial queries to the SndToI and Update oracles, and ε is non negligible in k, then
we can can build an adversary A, that breaks existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack
for CL signatures. We give A in Figure 27. Below we describe why the simulation given in Figure 27
is indistinguishable to the Traceability experiment to A′ and how A works. A has input parameters
(G1,G2,G3, p, t̂, G1, G2), the public key (X = Gα2 , Y = G
β
2 ), and access to a CLSIGN oracle which takes
input f and outputs (a, aβ , aα+fαβ), for a←$G1.
SndToI(uid, (F, πF ))
if uid ∈ HL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CL
CL← CL ∪ {uid}, decuid ← cont
n←$Z∗p return n
else if not the second query to SndToI for uid continue from line 2 of original SndToI oracle
if πF not valid, F /∈ G1 or F = 1 return ⊥
Extract fuid from πF , (Auid, Buid, Cuid)←$ CLSIGN(fuid), Duid ← Bfuiduid , cre← (Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid)
Simulate πcre, reg[uid]← (F, cre)
return (((Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid), πcre), reg[uid])
Update(uid, t, r):
(A,B,C)←$ CLSIGN(fuid(1 + γH2(r, t)))
ω1 ← A,ω2 ← B1+γH2(r,t), ω3 ← C, simulate πU
return (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU )
ACLSIGN((G1,G2,G3, p, t̂, G1, G2), X, Y )
param already defined, b←$ {0, 1}, create empty lists H1, H2,CL
γ ←$Z∗p, gpk ← (X,Y, Y γ)
(Ω,m, bsn, r, t, gsk1, · · · , gskl)←$A′
SndToI,Update
(param, gpk)
Extract f∗ from π include in Ω
Let Ω = (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, c, s)
return (f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)), A′, B′1/(1+γH2(r,t), C′)
Fig. 27: A which breaks Existential Unforgeability under the Chosen Message Attack for CL signatures,
using A′ which breaks Traceability of CDL*
We first show that all inputs that A provides to A′ are distributed identically to in the Traceability
experiment.
Simulating (param, gpk) gpk is chosen in exactly the same way as in Setup, except Z = Y γ instead of
Gγ1 . As γ is chosen randomly, this is distributed identically.
Simulating the SndToI oracle fuid can be extracted due to the online extractability of πF . (Auid, Buid, Cuid,
Duid) = (A,A
β , AαAαβfuid , Bfuiduid ), where A is chosen randomly and independently, so are distributed
identically to in CDL*Issue. πcre can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property. The SndToI oracle
is therefore distributed identically to in the Traceability experiment because due to the argument above
Z is distributed identically.
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Simulating the Update oracle (A,B,C) = (A,Aβ , AαAαβfuid(1+γH2(r,t))), where A is chosen randomly
and independently. Therefore ω1 = A,ω2 = A
β(1+γH2(r,t)), ω3 = A
αAαβfuid(1+γH2(r,t)). As Z = Y γ this
is distributed identically to in CDL*Update. πU can be simulated due to the zero knowledge property.
Reduction to Existential Unforgeability of CL signatures We now show that the output of A is a valid
forgery of a CL Signature with non-negligible probability. For this to be the case, (f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)), A′,
B′1/(1+γH2(r,t), C ′) output by A should be a valid CL signature, and f∗(1 + γH2(r, t) should not have
been queried to the CLSIGN oracle. For all potential strategies a successful A′ could take we show that A
is successful with non-negligible probability.
Assuming A′ is successful then Ω is valid and so B′ = A′β(1+γH2(r,t)), C ′ = (A′D′)α. We can extract
f∗ from Ω due to the simulation soundness of π, such that J = H1(bsn)f
∗
, D′ = B′f
∗
.
Therefore (A′, B′, C ′) = (A′, A′β(1+γH2(r,t)), A′αA′f
∗αβ(1+γH2(r,t))), and so (A′, B′1/(1+γH2(r,t)), C ′) =
(A′, A′β , A′αA′f
∗αβ(1+γH2(r,t))). Therefore A outputs a valid CL signature.
We now show that f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) was not queried to CLSIGN by A.
For each uid successfully queried to SndToI, with transcript T = (nuid, (Gfuid1 , πF ),
((Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid), πcre)), asA is successful, there must be k ∈ [1, l] such that CDL*IdentifyT (T , gskk)
= 1. Therefore gskk = (fuid, (Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid)). As CDL*IdentifyS(bsn,m, r, t, Ω, gskk)) = 0, then
D′ 6= B′fuid . Therefore fuid 6= f∗ for all uid queried to SndToRH.
Then f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) was only queried before to CLSIGN if for some uid ∈ CL, f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) =
fuid(1 + γH2(r′, t′) and (uid, r′, t′) queried to Update and (r′, t′) 6= (r, t), or f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) = fuid.
If f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) = fuid(1 + γH2(r′, t′), then γ(H2(r, t)f∗ − H2(r′, t′)fuid) = fuid − f∗, therefore
H2(r, t)f∗ −H2(r′, t′)fuid) 6= 0 as fuid − f∗ 6= 0. Therefore γ = fuid−f
∗
H2(r,t)f∗−H2(r′,t′)fuid = and A can solve
the discrete logarithm problem.
If f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) = fuid, then γ = (fuidf∗−1 − 1)/H2(r, t), so unless H2(r, t) or f∗ = 0 then A can
solve the discrete logarithm problem. If f∗ = 0 then fuid = 0, which is not possible as this would have
been rejected by SndToI. H2(r, t) = 0 with negligible probability.
Therefore A can break the existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks of CL signature
with non–negligible probability.
Second Traceability Game
In the second game the adversary wins if it outputs two valid signatures, and a secret key, such
that the signatures do not link, and both identify to the secret key. Let a winning adversary out-
























. However the signatures are not linked so J0 6= J1. As the signature is valid
J0 = H1(bsn)f = J1, which is a contradiction.
C.4 Non-Frameability
Theorem 4. [Non–Frameability]Assuming the random oracle model, the DL assumption in G1, and
the SPK is zero knowledge, simulation sound and online extractable (where underlined), CDL* satisfies
Non–Frameability.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists for the first Non–Frameability game, such that
Expnon−frameA′,Π (k) = ε, with n queries to SndToU for distinct users and ε is non negligible in k, then we
can can build an adversary A, that breaks the DL problem. We give A in Figure 28. Below we describe
why the simulation given in Figure 28 is indistinguishable to the first game of the Non–Frameability
experiment, and how A′ works.




if uid /∈ HL
HL← HL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1,gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,Stuidjn ← (gpk)
if l = k∗ uid∗ ← uid, F ← Q,2 simulate πF with F, n,St
uid
jn ← (⊥, F, πF )
return ((F, πF ), cont)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in Non–Frameability experiment
USK(uid):
if uid = uid∗ A aborts
else perform original USK oracle
GSig(bsn,m, uid, r, t, (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU ):
if uid = uid∗
if πU not valid , return ⊥ else Extract a from πU
Extract t from πcre saved for user uid
∗, a′ ← atβ−1
if ω2 6= G1a





a←$Z∗p, A′ ← ωa1 , B′ ← ωa2 , C′ ← ωa3 , D′ ← Q
aa′(γH2(r,t)+β)
2
if bsn =⊥ simulate π return (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
h← H1(bsn) let (bsn, h, d) ∈ H1
J ← Qd2, simulate π
return (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
else perform original GSig oracle
H1(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·) ∈ H1 return out







Create empty lists H1,HL, l← 0, k∗ ←$Z∗p, G1 ← Q1
Other than G1 generate (gpk, isk) as in CDL*KeyGen
(bsn,m, uid, r, t, Ω)←$A′SndToU,USK,GSig,H1(param, gpk, isk)
Extract f∗ from π included in Ω
return f∗
Fig. 28: A which breaks DL problem in G1, using A′ which breaks Non–frameability in the first game of
CDL* signatures
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Simulating inputs to A′ (gpk, isk) are chosen in exactly the same way as in CDL*KeyGen. Provided A
does not abort, the outputs of the USK, SndToU and GSig oracles are identical to in the Non–frameability
experiment.
If A does not abort, the USK oracle is exactly the same as in the Non–frameability experiment. The
SndToU oracle is distributed identically for uid∗ because F is chosen randomly, and πF can be simulated
due to the zero knowledge property. Otherwise SndToU is identical to in the experiment. Note that f is set
as ⊥, but this is not output to A′, or used in the next stage of the protocol. The H1 oracle is distributed
identically to the random oracle model.
If uid 6= uid∗ is input then the GSig oracle is identical to in the Non–frameability experiment. If
uid = uid∗ is input, the oracle first checks that (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU ) are distributed correctly as in CDL*Sign,
by extracting the exponent of ω1 with respect to A from the proof πU , and extracting the exponent
of A with respect to G1 using the proof πcre. A
′, B′, C ′ are chosen as in CDL*Sign, D′ is distributed
correctly because letting Q2 = Q
f






′f . J is distributed
identically becauseH1(bsn) = Qd1, and J = Qd2 = H1(bsn)f . Due to the zero knowledge property, π can be
simulated. Therefore the output of GSig is distributed identically to in the Non-Frameability experiment.
Reduction to the DL problem Assuming A′ was successful, Ω was not output by GSig, therefore due to
the simulation soundness property, f∗ can be extracted from π.
We assume uid = uid∗, which occurs with probability 1/n, then as Ω is valid, and identifies under
CDL*IdentifyS to user uid
∗, then D′ = B′f so f = f∗, thereforeA successfully solves the discrete logarithm
problem. As A′ is successful, uid∗ was not queried to the USK oracle and so A does not abort.
This means A successfully finds the discrete logarithm with probability ε/n.
Second Non–Frameability Game
We show that if an adversary A′ exists for the second Non–Frameability game, such that
Expnon−frameA′,Π (k) = ε, with q different bsn queries to H1 and ε is non negligible in k, then we can can
build an adversary A, that breaks the DL problem. We give A in Figure 29. Below we describe why the
simulation given in Figure 29 is indistinguishable to the second game of the Non–Frameability experiment,
and how A′ works.
H1(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·) ∈ H1 return out













Create empty lists H1, l← 0, k∗ ←$ [1, q]
Generate (param, gpk, isk) as in CDL*Setup,CDL*KeyGen
(bsn0,m0, r0, t0, Ω0, bsn1,m1, r1, t1, Ω1, gsk)←$A′
H1(param, gpk, isk)
Extract f0, f1 from proofs included in Ω0, Ω1
Let (bsn0, Y0, d
′






Fig. 29: A which breaks DL problem in G1, using A′ which breaks Non–frameability in the second game
of CDL* signatures
All inputs that A provides to A′ are distributed identically to in the Non–Frameability experiment.
This is because gpk, isk are generated identically and the hash functions are in the random oracle model.
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1, J1, π1). We assume A′ is successful. As Ω0,
Ω1 are valid signatures f0, f1 can be extracted such that J0 = H1(bsn0)f0 and J1 = H1(bsn1)f1 . As the
signatures link J0 = J1. If f0 = f1 then bsn0 = bsn1 and both signatures will identify to the same user
so the adversary will not win, therefore f0 6= f1 and so bsn0 6= bsn1. We assume bsn0 was the k∗th query
made to H1, which occurs with probability 1/q. Then J0 = Q
d′0f0
2 and J1 = Q
d′1f1




This means A successfully finds the discrete logarithm with probability ε/q.
C.5 Unforgeability of Reputation
Theorem 5. [Unforgeability of Reputation]Assuming that CL signatures are existentially unforge-
able under the chosen message attack , and the SPK is zero knowledge, simulation sound, and online
extractable (for the underlined values), CDL* satisfies Unforgeability of Reputation.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists for the Unforgeability of Reputation game, such that
Expunforge−repA′,Π (k) = ε, and ε is non negligible in k, then we can can build an adversary A, that breaks
existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack for CL signatures. We give A in Figure 30.
SndToI(uid, (F, πF ))
if uid ∈ HL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CL
CL← CL∪ = ∪{uid}, decuid ← cont
n←$Z∗p return n
else if not the second query to SndToI for uid continue from line 2 of original SndToI oracle
if πF not valid, F /∈ G1 or F = 1 return ⊥
Extract fuid from πF , (Auid, Buid, Cuid)←$ CLSIGN(fuid), Duid ← Bfuiduid
Simulate πcre, reg[uid]← (F, cre)
return (((Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid), πcre), reg[uid])
Update(uid, t, r):
(A,B,C)←$ CLSIGN(fuid(1 + γH2(r, t)))
ω1 ← A,ω2 ← B1+γH2(r,t), ω3 ← C, simulate πU
return (ω1, ω2, ω3, πU )
ACLSIGN((G1,G2,G3, p, t̂, G1, G2), X, Y )
param already defined, b←$ {0, 1}, create empty lists H1,CL
γ ←$Z∗p, gpk ← (X,Y, Y γ)
(Ω,m, bsn, r, t, uid∗, gsk1, · · · , gskl)←$A′
SndToI,Update
(param, gpk)
Let Ω = (A′, B′, C′, D′, J, π)
Extract f∗ from π
return (f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)), A′, B′1/(1+γH2(r,t), C′)
Fig. 30: A which breaks existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack for CL signatures,
using A′ which breaks Unforgeability of Reputation of CDL* Signatures
The simulation given in Figure 30 is indistinguishable to the Unforgeability of Reputation experiment,
because it is identical to in the Traceability proof, and the input to the adversary in Unforgeability of
Reputation and Traceability are the same.
We now show why A breaks the unforgeability of CL signatures with non–negligible probability.
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Reduction to Existential Unforgeability of CL signatures We now show that the output of A is a valid
forgery of a CL Signature with non-negligible probability. For this to be the case, (f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)), A′,
B′1/(1+γH2(r,t), C ′) output by A should be a valid CL signature, and f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) should not have
been queried to the CLSIGN oracle.
Assuming A′ is successful then Ω is valid and so B′ = A′β(1+γH2(r,t)), C ′ = (A′D′)α. We can extract
f∗ from π due to the simulation soundness property, such that J = H1(bsn)f
∗
, D′ = B′f
∗
.
Therefore (A′, B′, C ′) = (A′, A′β(1+γH2(r,t)), A′αA′f
∗αβ(1+γH2(r,t))), and so (A′, B′1/(1+γH2(r,t)), C ′) =
(A′, A′β , A′αA′f
∗αβ(1+γH2(r,t))). Therefore A outputs a valid CL signature.
We now show that f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) was not queried to CLSIGN by A.
As A′ is successful, they have output uid∗ and gsk∗ such that Ω identifies to gsk∗ under CDL*IdentifyS
and gsk∗ is the secret key associated to the transcript of the SndToI query for user uid∗ under CDL*IdentifyT .
Therefore f∗ = fuid∗ . As (uid
∗, t, r) /∈ UL, f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) was not queried to CLSIGN during a query to
the Update oracle or SndToI oracle for user uid∗.
For all other uid′ ∈ CL, there exists gsk′ associated to this user output by A′, if fuid′ = f∗ then this
would identify to the signature under CDL*IdentifyS meaning that |KL| > 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore fuid′ 6= f∗.
Then f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) was only queried before to CLSIGN if for some uid′ ∈ CL/{uid∗}, f∗(1 +
γH2(r, t)) = fuid′(1 + γH2(r′, t′) where (uid′, r′, t′) was queried to Update and (r′, t′) 6= (r, t), or f∗(1 +
γH2(r, t)) = fuid′ .
If f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) = fuid′(1 + γH2(r′, t′), then γ(H2(r, t)f∗ −H2(r′, t′)fuid′) = fuid′ − f∗, therefore
H2(r, t)f∗−H2(r′, t′)fuid′) 6= 0 as fuid′ − f∗ 6= 0. Therefore γ = fuid′−f
∗
H2(r,t)f∗−H2(r′,t′)fuid′
= and A can solve
the discrete logarithm problem.
If f∗(1 + γH2(r, t)) = fuid′ , then γ = (fuid′f∗−1 − 1)/H2(r, t), so unless H2(r, t) = 0 or f∗ = 0 then
A can solve the discrete logarithm problem. f∗ = 0 is not possible as this would have been rejected by
SndToI. H2(r, t) = 0 with negligible probability.
Therefore A can break the existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks of CL signature
with non–negligible probability.
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